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DEFINING TERRORISM: THE EVOLUTION
OF TERRORISM AS A LEGAL CONCEPT IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS
INFLUENCE ON DEFINITIONS IN
DOMESTIC LEGISLATION
Reuven Young*
Abstract: This Article examines the evolution of the deªnition of terror-
ism at international law and tests the widely held view that international
law does not provide a deªnition of terrorism. It contends that by ab-
stracting from the common elements and themes present in the United
Nations General Assembly and Security Council resolutions concerning
terrorism, and the multi-lateral anti-terrorism conventions, treaties, and
protocols, one can discern a core international law deªnition of terror-
ism. The Article then compares this deªnition to those in the domestic
legal systems of the United States, United Kingdom, India, and New
Zealand to determine whether (1) international law was inºuential in
the drafting of these deªnitions or in the anti-terrorism legislative pro-
cess generally and (2) these deªnitions are consistent with the inter-
national law deªnition discerned from the existing sources of interna-
tional law relating to terrorism. It concludes that until a customary
international law rule prohibiting terrorism emerges or a comprehen-
sive terrorism convention is concluded, states should draw on the inter-
national law deªnition of terrorism when drafting their domestic anti-
terrorism legislation for legal and policy reasons, including to enhance
the protection of human rights. The Article also examines the history of
the development of the international law anti-terrorism instruments and
the development of a comprehensive terrorism convention and model
domestic legislation, and serves as a study of the implementation or
incorporation of international law treaty obligations into domestic law in
the context of terrorism.
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The search for a legal deªnition of terrorism in some ways resembles the
quest for the Holy Grail: periodically, eager souls set out, full of purpose,
energy and self-conªdence, to succeed where so many others before have tried
and failed.
—Geoffrey Levitt, Is “Terrorism” Worth Deªning?, 13 Ohio N.U. L.
Rev. 97, 97 (1986).
I. An Old Problem of Unsettled Scope
Opening his lectures at the Academy of International Law at The
Hague in 1938, Antoine Sottile said of international terrorism: “The
intensiªcation of terrorist activity in the past few years has made ter-
rorism one of today’s most pressing problems.”1
Such concerns have been frequently repeated over the last sixty-
eight or so years. Terrorism’s grave threat did not start with Al Qaeda.
Writing in 1977, M.K. Nawaz and Gurdip Singh quoted Sottile and
added that the “verdict is no less true in our contemporary times.”2
Popular opinion in the West would endorse the statement’s continuing
cogency. Without being asked a question about terrorism, U.S. Presi-
dent George W. Bush referred to “terrorism” (or a variant of the word)
twenty-two times in a 2004 televised interview.3 International terrorism
is frequently cited by world leaders as the greatest threat to Western
democracies, a claim made before4 and after September 11, 2001.5
Notwithstanding the great concern about terrorism, it is most
often said that no universally (or even widely) accepted deªnition of
terrorism exists at international law.6 Since at least the 1920s and
                                                                                                                     
1 Antoine Sottile, Le Terrorisme International, in 65 Recueil des Cours 89, 91 (1938).
2 M.K. Nawaz & Gurdip Singh, Legal Control of International Terrorism, 17 Indian J. Int’l
L. 66, 66 (1977); see also Bogdan Zlataric, History of International Terrorism and its Legal Con-
trol, in International Terrorism and Political Crimes 474, 474 (M. Cherif Bassiouni
ed., 1975).
3 John V. Whitbeck, A World Ensnared by a Word; ‘Terrorism,’ Int’l Herald Trib., Feb.
18, 2004, at 6.
4 See, e.g., Guy B. Roberts, Self-Help in Combating State-Sponsored Terrorism: Self-Defense and
Peacetime Reprisals, 19 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 243, 247 (1987).
5 See, e.g., Xavier Baron, Newly-minted EU Anti-terror Unit to Study Casablanca Blasts, Agence
France-Presse, May 19, 2003, available at www.eubusiness.com/imported/2003/05/110512/
(quoting Spanish Interior Minister Interior Angel Acebes); Jim Garamone, Iraq ‘a Grave and
Gathering Danger,’ Bush Tells U.N., Am. Forces Press Service, Sept. 12, 2002, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2002/n09122002_200209122.html.
6 See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Ed-
wards, J., concurring) (“[T]he nations of the world are so divisively split on the legitimacy
[of terrorism] as to make it impossible to pinpoint an area of harmony or consensus.”),
cert. den’d, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985); Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 17
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1930s many states have recognized terrorism as a transnational prob-
lem requiring a solution originating at international law. This Article
examines the evolution of terrorism as a legal concept at interna-
tional law and challenges the commonly accepted view that interna-
tional law does not contain a deªnition of terrorism.7 This Article
contends that “terrorism” has a core, objectively determinable mean-
ing at international law, and that one can discern such a deªnition
from the existing sources of international law relating to terrorism.
The Article is divided into two main sections: Part Two examines
the development of the deªnition of terrorism at international law
and Part Three examines four deªnitions of terrorism in domestic law
and considers whether (1) international law was inºuential in their
formation and (2) the domestic deªnitions are consistent with the
international deªnitional jurisprudence. Through treaty law, the in-
ternational community has required signatory states to criminalize
certain acts of terrorism by enacting domestic legislation. This ap-
proach to counter-terrorism makes the deªnitions of terrorism in
domestic counter-terrorism legislation crucial to the effectiveness of
international law’s response.
After contextualizing terrorism as a phenomenon, Part Two then
examines the evolution of the deªnition of terrorism at international
law. It ªrst examines the failed efforts in the 1920s and 1930s to deªne
terrorism and then considers the United Nations General Assembly’s
resolutions with respect to terrorism and, more importantly, the resolu-
tions of the United Nations Security Council. There are thirteen multi-
lateral terrorism conventions, which have attracted widespread sup-
port.8 This Article analyzes their prohibitions and argues that a core
                                                                                                                     
(D.D.C. 1998) (citing U.S. Dep’t. of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, at vi, 1, 17
(2003), available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2002/html/19997.htm) (“Attempts
to reach a ªxed, universally accepted deªnition of international terrorism have been frus-
trated both by changes in terrorist methodology and the lack of any precise deªnition of
the term ‘terrorism.’”); M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Terrorism: Multilateral
Conventions (1937–2001), at 15 (2001) [hereinafter Bassiouni, Multilateral Con-
ventions]; R.R. Baxter, A Skeptical Look at the Concept of Terrorism, 7 Akron L. Rev. 380, 380
(1974); Kevin J. Greene, Terrorism as Impermissible Political Violence: An International Law
Framework, 16 Vt. L. Rev. 461, 462 (1992); Ileana M. Porras, On Terrorism: Reºections on
Violence and the Outlaw, 1994 Utah L. Rev. 119, 125; Sami Zeidan, Desperately Seeking
Deªnition: The International Community’s Quest for Identifying the Spectre of Terrorism, 36 Cor-
nell Int’l L.J. 491, 491 (2004); Kenneth Watkin, Canada/United States Military
Interoperability and Humanitarian Law Issues: Land Mines, Terrorism, Military Objectives and
Targeted Killing, 15 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 281, 294 (2005).
7 See sources cited in supra note 6.
8 See Appendix 1.
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deªnition of terrorism is discernable from the overlap of the conven-
tions’ prohibitions and the themes present in each of the conventions.9
This Article advances the proposition that states should draw on this
core international deªnition of terrorism when enacting domestic
deªnitions for both legal and pragmatic reasons, even though this
minimum deªnition of terrorism has not attained customary interna-
tional law status.
Part Three of the Article turns to the deªnitions of terrorism in
domestic law. First, it considers the deªnitions in the United Kingdom,
United States, India, and New Zealand (states that have experienced
terrorism to varying degrees, but all of which enacted or signiªcantly
amended their counter-terrorism legislation after September 11), as-
sessing whether international law inºuenced the formation of their
deªnitions. Second, the substance of the four domestic deªnitions of
terrorism is compared with the deªnition of terrorism at international
law identiªed in Part Two.
The Article concludes that there is a core deªnition of terrorism at
international law that provides guidance to states enacting terrorism
legislation, but that to have an effect, states must look to international
law and accept its guidance. Although the four domestic deªnitions are
substantively similar to the international deªnition, all states should
treat the international law deªnitional jurisprudence as setting a mini-
mum level, not a maximum. The international deªnition of terrorism
is destined to develop very slowly, and states need to tailor their legisla-
tion to speciªc national circumstances and respond to threats. The ease
with which terrorists can cross borders means states cannot protect
themselves simply by enacting and enforcing domestic legislation pro-
scribing terrorism within their borders. Rather, every state must have
legislation denying terrorists safe havens and safe places of operation.
An established minimum international law deªnition of terrorism that
informs states’ domestic criminal law is required to ensure a baseline of
consistency and to facilitate international cooperation. The core
deªnition identiªed in this Article provides that minimum as well as a
yardstick against which to measure states’ legislation.
The existence of a deªnition of terrorism is important. It shapes
states’ understanding of the problem, delimits their responses to it,
and helps to distinguish lawful from unlawful responses. The per-
ceived absence of an accepted international law deªnition is said by
                                                                                                                     
9 But see Jean-Marc Sorel, Some Questions About the Deªnition of Terrorism and the Fight
Against its Financing, 14 Eur. J. Int’l L. 365, 365, 368 (2003).
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some largely to explain the inadequacy of international law’s ability to
combat terrorism.10 Do states share a common deªnition of interna-
tional terrorism? Or at least, is there sufªcient conceptual consensus
to facilitate international cooperation in the “war on terrorism”? Is
the enemy in the war sufªciently well deªned to give “war” a real
meaning?11 Or is the enemy so broad to render speaking of “war”
meaningless? Perhaps George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four is pro-
phetic?12 Furthermore, many international instruments require states
to take steps to ªght terrorism. Without a clear deªnition of what to
ªght, states can unduly curtail civil rights and suppress political oppo-
sition under the pretext of ªghting terrorism.13 The grant of police
powers triggered by terrorism without deªning terrorism is inconsis-
tent with the rule of law.
A. Brief History of Terrorism through Time
Generally speaking, for hundreds of years “terrorism” has been
used as a pejorative term, usually applied to “the other side.” This is
the word’s political descriptor role; its signiªcance as a legal term is
more recent.14
The root word “terror” (from the Latin “terrere”—“to frighten”)
entered Western European languages’ lexicons through French in the
fourteenth century and was ªrst used in English in 1528.15 “Terrorism”
gained its political connotations from its use during the French Revo-
lution. The French legislature led by Maximilien Robespierre, con-
cerned about the aristocratic threat to the revolutionary government,
ordered the public execution of 17,000 people (“regime de la terreur”)
to educate the citizenry of the necessity of virtue.16 Robespierre’s sup-
                                                                                                                     
10 Ved Nanda, The Role of International Law in Combatting Terrorism, 10 Mich. St. U.
DCL J. Int’l L. 603, 604 (2001).
11 See Joan Fitzpatrick, Jurisdiction of Military Commissions and the Ambiguous War on Ter-
rorism, 96 Am. J. Int’l L. 345, 347–50 (2002).
12 See generally George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949) (describing a war of
ambiguous scope and uncertain duration).
13 See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties
under Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, Egypt,
¶ 16, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/76/EGY (Nov. 28, 2002).
14 See infra Part II(B).
15 Alex P. Schmid, The Problems of Deªning Terrorism, in Encyclopedia of World Ter-
rorism 12, 12 (Martha Crenshaw & John Pimlott eds., 1997).
16 Id. at 12–13; see also Peter J. van Krieken, Terrorism and the International Le-
gal Order with Special Reference to the UN, the EU and Cross-Border Aspects 13
(2002) (describing other instances of government-sponsored terrorism used to engender
fear in the citizenry).
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porters who turned against him, having supported the use of terror in
the ªrst instance, accused him of using terrorism in an attempt to
identify the illegitimate use of terror.17 Terrorism, initially associated
with state-perpetrated violence, shifted to describing non-state actors
following its application to the French and Russian anarchists of the
1880s and 1890s.18
Terrorism following World War II harnessed newly developed
technology. Terrorist hijackings of civil aviation aircraft were a feared
and relatively common occurrence.19 The international community
responded with a series of treaties which, in tandem with increased
airport security, successfully reduced the incidence of harm to aircraft
and passengers. The United Nations’ response to a series of terrorist
attacks on diplomats and civilians in the 1970s was similarly reaction-
ary.20 The International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages
(Hostages Convention) followed in 1979, although it did not result in
fewer hostage-taking incidents.21 Of course, law alone is insufªcient; it
must be buttressed with faithful enforcement and effective prevention
strategies.22
The terrorism that began in the early 1990s differs from that of the
1960s and 1970s23 (although terrorism motivated by the goal of de-
colonization still exists, inter alia, in the Middle East and around Kash-
mir).24 This modern variety of terrorism comes from a mix of religious
afªliation intertwined with political ideology and geo-political goals.25 It
poses a greater threat to society, in part because modern terrorists are
harder to deter than the terrorists of the 1960s who were concerned—
at least to a greater extent—with the harmful consequences of their
                                                                                                                     
17 Schmid, supra note 15, at 13.
18 These groups sought to affect political change through violence against symbolic
targets that would, they hoped, arouse the masses. See id. at 13–14. See generally Joseph
Conrad, The Secret Agent (1907).
19 See Alona E. Evans, Aircraft Hijacking: Its Cause and Cure, 63 Am. J. Int’l L. 695, 697–
98 (1969).
20 See Caleb Pilgrim, Terrorism in National and International Law, 8 Dick. J. Int’l L. 147,
151 (1990).
21 Bassiouni, Multilateral Conventions, supra note 6, at 48.
22 See, e.g., Alberto R. Coll, Comment, The Legal and Moral Adequacy of Military Responses
to Terrorism, 81 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 297, 304 (1987) (noting that Egyptian President
Mubarak sent the hijackers responsible for the murder of a U.S. citizen during the seizure
of the Achille Lauro away from Egypt to avoid having to exercise Egypt’s extradition juris-
diction under foreign pressure).
23 See Michael Whine, Antisemitism Worldwide 2000/1: The New Terrorism,
http://www.tau.ac.il/Anti-Semitism/asw2000-1/whine.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2005).
24 Ownership of provinces of Kashmir and Jammu is disputed by India and Pakistan.
25 See Bassiouni, Multilateral Conventions, supra note 6, at 46, 47, 52.
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actions.26 Furthermore, the relationship between the means employed
and the terrorists’ ends is more attenuated than in the past. Although
the frequency of terrorist attacks has been relatively constant since
1989,27 the increasing scale of attacks (as September 11, the Bali and
Madrid bombings, the siege at Beslan, and the London bombing tragi-
cally illustrate)28 is alarming. September 11, illustrating that terrorism
crosses national and ethnic boundaries,29 changed the prevailing atti-
tude to terrorism and certainly the attitude of the most inºuential
states. The proliferation and greater availability of weapons of mass de-
struction,30 modern society’s dependence on computer systems, and
the emergence of cyber-terrorism31 increases the likelihood of a large-
scale high-impact terrorist attack.
The use of civil aviation aircraft to destroy the World Trade Cen-
ter towers in New York and part of the Pentagon building in Virginia
on September 11 is perceived as highlighting deªciencies in interna-
tional anti-terrorism law and enforcement: the lack of international
police and intelligence coordination; the absence of a comprehensive
deªnition of terrorism; and insufªcient international criminal law
infrastructure.32 The attacks’ scale and principal victim jolted world
opinion. Consequently, the Security Council issued an interventionist
resolution, the U.N. General Assembly took up the terrorism debate
with increased vigor, and, generally speaking, states and non-state en-
tities reafªrmed the relevance of international law and cooperation in
preventing and punishing terrorism.
                                                                                                                     
26 Id. at 52–53.
27 See U.S. Dep’t of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, supra note 6, app. H.
28 On September 11, 2001, hijacked aircraft were ºown into the two World Trade Cen-
ter Towers in New York City and into the Pentagon Building in Virginia. Approximately
3000 people were killed. On October 12, 2002, 202 people were killed in a bombing of a
nightclub district in Bali, Indonesia. On March 11, 2004, bombs exploded on commuter
trains in Madrid, Spain killing approximately 200 people. On September 3, 2004, at least
339 people were killed in an attack on a school in Beslan, Russia. See Steven Lee Myers, In
Russia, Dissent Grows over Moves to Curb Regional Autonomy, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 2004, at A8.
On July 7, 2005, four explosions on London’s public transport system killed ªfty-two peo-
ple.
29 Nicholas Rostow, Before and After: The Changed U.N. Response to Terrorism Since September
11th, 35 Cornell Int’l L.J. 475, 476 (2002).
30 See Non Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction - A G8 Declaration ¶ 1
(2003), available at http://www.g8.fr/evian/english/navigation/2003_g8_summit/summit_
documents/non_proliferation_of_weapons_of_mass_destruction_-_a_g8_declaration.html.
31 See generally Susan W. Brenner & Marc D. Goodman, In Defense of Cyberterrorism: An
Argument for Anticipating Cyber-Attacks, 2002 U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol’y 1, 12–24, 27.
32 See Asli Bâli, Stretching the Limits of International Law: The Challenge of Terrorism, 8 ILSA
J. Int’l & Comp. L. 403, 408 (2002).
30 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 29:23
II. The Deªnition of Terrorism at International Law
Despite its prior exclusive use as a pejorative political term of
stigmatization, “terrorism” is increasingly used as a legal term33 and
therefore should be accompanied by a discrete meaning. The deªni-
tion certainly requires something more than “[w]hat looks, smells and
kills like terrorism is terrorism.”34
The seven sections in this Part of the Article examine the devel-
opment of terrorism as a legal concept at international law. Section A
considers the methodological issues with deªning terrorism and out-
lines the importance of an agreed upon deªnition. Section B tracks the
pre-United Nations development of the concept. Section C considers
the debate in the U.N. General Assembly and its various resolutions
and declarations with respect to terrorism. Section D addresses the role
of the Security Council, with particular attention given to Resolutions
1373 of 2001 and 1566 of 2004. Section E examines the international
anti-terrorism conventions and analyzes their contribution to establish-
ing a deªnition of terrorism. Section F distills a deªnition of terrorism
from the existing international anti-terrorism conventions and other
sources by identifying the substantive overlap in the quasi-deªnitional
statements and the common themes running through the conventions.
Finally, Section G concludes that there is considerable agreement re-
garding the core meaning of terrorism and brieºy notes the current
deªnitional developments and those likely in the near future.
A. It’s a Question of Deªnition
In 2001, following the September 11 attacks, the United Nations
Security Council declared that “acts of international terrorism consti-
tute one of the most serious threats to international peace and secu-
rity in the twenty-ªrst century,”35 but exactly what constitutes this
threat is subject to conjecture. Rather than deªne and prohibit terror-
ism in toto, international and domestic instruments frequently pro-
hibit particular acts recognized as falling under the banner of terror-
ism. Such acts are often proscribed without expressly acknowledging
                                                                                                                     
33 Cf. Christian Walter, Deªning Terrorism in National and International Law, in Terror-
ism as a Challenge for National and International Law: Security Versus Liberty?
23–43 (Cristian Walter et al. eds., 2004).
34 See Sir Jeremy Greenstock, KCMG Permanent Representative of the United King-
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, General Assembly Debate on Terrorism, 1
October 2001, (2001), http://www.un.org/terrorism/statements/ukE.html.
35 S.C. Res. 1377, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1377 (Nov. 12, 2001).
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that the acts are considered to be terrorism. Thus, when identifying
the content of terrorism as a concept, the inquiry cannot be limited
to international instruments that expressly mention terrorism. This
Part of the Article, however, limits itself to international law at large
(rather than regional international law, such as the law of the Euro-
pean Union or the Organization of African Unity). Part Three con-
siders domestic law deªnitions.
1. International Terrorism
Legal measures targeting terrorism operate on both the domestic
and international planes. To engage the United Nations, as a political
and legal matter, terrorism must have a signiªcant international di-
mension.36 Although a signiªcant proportion of terrorism is intra-
state, terrorism is frequently international in character: by crossing
borders (as in Kashmir), by the nationality of participant and/or vic-
tim (as in September 11), or by target despite being geographically
intra-state (for example, attacks on foreign visitors in Bali by Indone-
sia-based terrorists). Acts may also be considered international in
character when they attempt to inºuence foreign governments and
when they implicate the interests of more than one state.
2. The Importance of an Accepted Deªnition
The exclusion of terrorism from the jurisdiction of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court37 is consistent with the international commu-
nity’s approach of creating a web of overlapping national criminal ju-
risdictions to outlaw terrorist acts rather than creating a comprehensive
international regime. Notwithstanding this approach, a universally ac-
cepted deªnition is crucial, as it harmonizes the operation and interac-
tion of the overlapping domestic criminal jurisdictions (for example,
facilitating extradition). An accepted deªnition would enhance intelli-
                                                                                                                     
36 The United Nations’ mandate does not directly authorize addressing intra-state ter-
rorism although this strict international-domestic distinction seems artiªcial given the
pervasive inºuence of human rights. U.N. Charter art. 1. Contra Aaron J. Noteboom, Ter-
rorism: I Know It When I See It, 81 Or. L. Rev. 553, 559 (2002).
37 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. The exclusion of terrorism from the Court’s jurisdiction
largely resulted from an inability to deªne the elements of the crime. Richard J. Goldstone
& Janine Simpson, Evaluating the Role of the International Criminal Court as a Legal Response to
Terrorism, 16 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 13, 14 (2003).
32 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 29:23
gence sharing and international cooperation38 and permit tighter goal
deªnition in the “war against terrorism,” which might facilitate coali-
tion building and strengthen the legitimacy of the “war.” Imposing
sanctions and criticizing states that support terrorism would attract
broader support once a deªnition of terrorism is established.
In the United States, criminal prosecution of terrorists is a criti-
cal, if not the dominant, method of counter-terrorism.39 The effec-
tiveness and fairness of such an approach turns on whether there is a
clear deªnition of terrorism in the applicable laws.
The mobility of international terrorists allows them to select their
place of operation and strike at targets beyond their home state’s bor-
ders. Simply prohibiting terrorism in one state is not sufªcient to stop
terrorist attacks in all states. A common deªnition is needed to provide
a sufªcient “least common denominator” jurisdiction worldwide. Even
if all acts done by terrorists—for example, murder, property damage,
and kidnapping—should be crimes in all domestic jurisdictions notwith-
standing the obligations under the various conventions,40 the conven-
tions focus international attention, voice the commitment of states to
ªght terrorism, and help to ensure consistent criminalization.41
Security Council Resolution 1373 of 2001 imposes signiªcant obli-
gations on states to ªght terrorism.42 Nevertheless, without a common
understanding of against whom or what states should be ªghting, coun-
ter-terrorism obligations can be avoided or used to mask human rights
abuses. Human rights organizations have reported acts of repression
against legitimate political opposition or dissidents under the pretext of
ªghting terrorism,43 and, although not necessarily corrective, an ac-
cepted deªnition would make it harder to engage in such acts.
                                                                                                                     
38 See Jacqueline Ann Carberry, Terrorism: A Global Phenomenon Mandating a Uniªed In-
ternational Response, 6 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 685, 711 (1999).
39 See Jacques deLisle, The New Protracted Conºict: The Roles of Law in the Fight Against Ter-
rorism, 46 ORBIS 301, 306 (2002); Abraham Sofaer, Playing Games with Terrorists, 36 New
Eng. L. Rev. 903, 903 (2002). See generally Ronald Sievert, War of Terrorism or Global Law
Enforcement Operation?, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 307 (2003).
40 See Maurice Flory, International Law: Instruments to Combat Terrorism, in Terrorism
and International Law 31, 31 (Rosalyn Higgins & Maurice Flory eds., 1997).
41 See J.G. Starke, The Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, 19 Brit.
Y.B. Int’l L. 214, 215 (1938). Most terrorist acts (for example, murder) are illegal notwith-
standing terrorism prohibitions. Some commentators thus question the need for speciªc
terrorism crimes. See, e.g., Matthew Palmer, Counter-Terrorism Law, 2002 N.Z. L.J. 456.
42 S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
43 Russia and Egypt, for example, are alleged to have dismantled domestic political op-
position under the pretext of ªghting terrorism. See Human Rights Watch, In the Name of
Counter-Terrorism: Human Rights Abuses Worldwide (2003), available at http://www.
hrw.org/un/chr59/counter-terrorism-bck.pdf.
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This Article contends that there is a core meaning of terrorism
that should be accepted as the minimum international deªnition. This
core deªnition serves as a useful yardstick against which to measure
domestic terrorism legislation. The balance of this Part of the Article
argues that a deªnition emerges from the relevant conventions and
resolutions. As Emanuel Gross said: “[T]he majority of the deªnitions
have a common basis—terrorism is the use of violence and the imposi-
tion of fear to achieve a particular purpose.”44
Similarly, Professor Oscar Schachter remarked that the absence of
a comprehensive deªnition “does not mean that international terror-
ism is not identiªable. It has a core meaning that all deªnitions recog-
nize.”45 Speaking more broadly than just the legal deªnition of terror-
ism, Brian Jenkins said in 1992 that “a rough consensus on the meaning
of terrorism is emerging without any international agreement on the
precise deªnition.”46 This Article identiªes the parameters of this core
deªnition by examining the overlap of existing prohibitions but, more
importantly, by identifying recurrent themes present in statements at
international law about terrorism. Although the conventions are more
a product of political compromise than derived from principle, the ex-
tent of the overlap and common elements indicates a broad conceptual
consensus regarding terrorism as a legal concept.
B. Background to the International Law Deªnitions
Putting aside the question of whether terrorism breaches custom-
ary international law,47 acts of terrorism by non-state actors generally do
not constitute a breach of international law per se. Since the early
twentieth century, the international community has, however, engaged
with the non-state actor terrorism issue. The ªrst U.N. General Assem-
bly resolution concerning terrorism was passed in 1972.48 From this
time onwards, the United Nations, principally the General Assembly,
attempted to offer leadership towards eliminating international terror-
                                                                                                                     
44 Emanuel Gross, Legal Aspects of Tackling Terrorism: The Balance Between the Right of a
Democracy to Defend Itself and the Protection of Human Rights, 6 UCLA J. Int’l L. & Foreign
Aff. 89, 97 (2001).
45 Oscar Schachter, The Extraterritorial Use of Force Against Terrorist Bases, 11 Hous. J.
Int’l L. 309, 309 (1989).
46 Schmid, supra note 15, at 18.
47 See infra Part II, Section G; see also generally Ross E. Schreiber, Ascertaining Opinio Juris
of States Concerning Norms Involving the Prevention of International Terrorism: A Focus on U.N.
Process, 16 B.U. Int’l L.J. 309 (1998).
48 See G.A. Res. 3034 (XXVII), U.N. GAOR, 27th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/3034(XXVII)
(Dec. 18, 1972).
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ism.49 Before the post-September 11 paradigm shift, however, the
United Nations viewed terrorism as a social phenomenon and generally
exhibited an ambivalent attitude towards it.50 Amongst other things,
this manifested itself in a failure to agree to a comprehensive deªni-
tion. September 11, however, converted terrorism from an “issue of on-
going concern” for the General Assembly to an issue sufªciently threat-
ening to international peace and security to engage the Security Coun-
cil.
Prior to the most recent terrorism convention being opened for
signature,51 the Secretary-General identiªed twenty-one global or re-
gional treaties pertaining to international terrorism, twelve of which
are global.52 Most do not refer to terrorism explicitly. In general
terms, the international conventions seek to utilize domestic criminal
law to eliminate international terrorism rather than to establish “in-
                                                                                                                     
49 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 42/159, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. A/RES/42/159 (Dec. 7, 1987) (“Recog-
nizing that the effectiveness of the struggle against terrorism could be enhanced by the
establishment of a generally agreed deªnition of international terrorism”).
50 Rostow, supra note 29, at 475.
51 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (opened
for signature Sept. 14, 2005), available at http://untreaty.un.org/English/notpubl/Eng-
lish_18_15.pdf [hereinafter Nuclear Terrorism Convention].
52 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9,
1999, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-49, G.A. Res. 54/109, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 49,
U.N. Doc. A/54/49 [hereinafter Financing Convention]; International Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Dec. 15, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-6, 37 I.L.M. 249
[hereinafter Bombings Convention]; Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for
the Purpose of Detection, Mar. 1, 1991, U.S. Treaty Doc. No. 103–8, 2122 U.N.T.S. 359
[hereinafter Plastic Explosives Convention]; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, Mar. 10, 1988, 27
I.L.M. 685 [hereinafter Fixed Platforms Convention]; Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, S. Treaty Doc. No.
101-1, 27 I.L.M. 668 [hereinafter Maritime Convention]; Protocol for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation [supplement to
the Montreal Convention], Feb. 24, 1988, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-19, 1589 U.N.T.S. 474
[hereinafter Montreal Airports Protocol]; Convention on the Physical Protection of Nu-
clear Material, Mar. 3, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11080, 1456 U.N.T.S. 101 [hereinafter Nuclear
Materials Convention]; International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17,
1979, T.I.A.S. No. 11081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Hostages Convention]; Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Per-
sons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167 [here-
inafter Internationally Protected Persons Convention]; Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 546565, 974
U.N.T.S. 178 ( Jan. 26, 1973) [hereinafter Montreal Convention]; Convention for the Sup-
pression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105
[hereinafter The Hague Convention]; Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts
Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 [hereinaf-
ter Tokyo Convention].
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ternational crimes.” This makes domestic law deªnitions of terrorism
crucial, as discussed in Part Three.
1. Early Deªnitions of Terrorism at International Law
“Terrorism” was probably ªrst used as a legal term in interna-
tional legal circles in 1931 at the Third Conference for the
Uniªcation of Penal Law at Brussels.53 The proposed deªnition of an
act of terrorism was:
[T]he intentional use of means capable of producing a
common danger that represents an act of terrorism on the
part of anyone making use of crimes against life, liberty or
physical integrity of persons or directed against private or
state property with the purpose of expressing or executing
political or social ideas . . . .54
The Sixth Conference in Copenhagen in 1935 adopted a text that
deªned terrorism in Article 1 as:
International acts directed against the life, physical integrity,
health or freedom of a head of state or his spouse, or any per-
son holding the prerogatives of a head of state, as well as
crown princes, members of governments, people enjoying
diplomatic immunity, and members of the constitutional, leg-
islative or judicial bodies [if the perpetrator creates] a com-
mon danger, or a state of terror that might incite a change or
raise an obstacle to the functioning of public bodies or a dis-
turbance to international relations.55
Certain other acts—for example, instigating a calamity—were
considered under Article 2 to create a common danger or to provoke
a state of terror. As today, in the 1930s there were concerns about the
efªcacy of international cooperation in combating terrorism.56
International efforts to curb terrorist acts ªrst found expression
in the League of Nations’ Convention for the Prevention and Pun-
                                                                                                                     
53 See V.S. Mani, International Terrorism—Is a Deªnition Possible?, 18 Indian J. Int’l L.
206, 207 (1978); Nawaz & Singh, supra note 2, at 66–67; Zlataric, supra note 2, at 479.
54 Zlataric, supra note 2, at 479.
55 Id. at 481–82.
56 See Proceedings of the International Conference on the Repression of Terrorism, League of
Nations Doc. C.94M.47 1938 V (1938), at 49 [hereinafter Proceedings of the International
Conference].
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ishment of Terrorism (1937 Terrorism Convention).57 This followed a
resolution stating “that the rules of international law concerning the
repression of terrorist activity are not at present sufªciently precise to
guarantee efªciently international co-operation . . . .”58 Following the
assassination of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia and the French For-
eign Minister in October 1934 (and Italy’s refusal to extradite the ac-
cused under the political crime exception),59 France proposed that
“international measures” be taken to address the problem. A panel of
experts provided a draft of the convention, which was considered in
1937.60 The same conference considered a complementary conven-
tion creating an international criminal court exercising jurisdiction
over the substantive convention.61
The substantive 1937 Terrorism Convention concerned only
transnational terrorism62 perpetrated by non-state actors thus avoid-
ing the controversial issue of terrorism by state actors.63 It deªned
“acts of terrorism” in paragraph 1 as “[c]riminal acts directed against
a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the
minds of particular persons, or a group of persons or the general pub-
lic.” States were required to enact legislation criminalizing terrorism
and certain other acts.64
The 1937 Terrorism Convention was signed by twenty-four states65
but was only ratiªed by India in January 1941.66 Neither this nor the
                                                                                                                     
57 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, Nov. 16, 1937, League
of Nations Doc. C.546M.383 (1937), reprinted in 7 International Legislation 862 (Man-
ley O. Hudson ed., 1941) [hereinafter 1937 Terrorism Convention]; Nawaz & Singh, supra
note 2, at 67.
58 Nawaz & Singh, supra note 2, at 67.
59 Mani, supra note 53, at 208.
60 The experts were appointed by Belgium, Chile, France, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Ro-
mania, Spain, Switzerland, U.K., and U.S.S.R. Proceedings of the International Conference, supra
note 56, at 49.
61 Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court, Nov. 16, 1937,
League of Nations Doc. C.547(1)M.384(1) (1937), reprinted in 7 International Legisla-
tion, supra note 57, at 878.
62 1937 Terrorism Convention, supra note 57, art. 2.
63 See id. art. 1(2).
64 See id. arts. 1(2), 2(1)–(5).
65 Id. The signatory states were: Albania, Argentina, Belgium, Great Britain, Bulgaria,
Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Ecuador, Spain, Estonia, France, Greece, Haiti, Monaco,
India, Norway, The Netherlands, Peru, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Turkey, U.S.S.R, Vene-
zuela, and Yugoslavia. Id.
66 India’s separate membership of the League of Nations entitled it to sign independ-
ently of Britain. This was the ªrst multilateral diplomatic convention that India signed
when no other commonwealth states did so. Starke, supra note 41, at 215. One author
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complementary convention ever entered into force,67 and they were
overtaken by World War II.68 The broad deªnition of terrorism con-
tributed to the low number of signatures and ratiªcations. Britain, for
example, did not ratify it because of foreseen difªculties with drawing
up the required implementing domestic legislation.69 Foreshadowing
criticism of terrorism conventions generally, J.G. Starke said of the 1937
Terrorism Convention in 1938 that “there can be few, if any, civilised
countries in which legislation of the type provided for is not in force”
and “for the prevention of terrorist outrages . . . co-operation is likely to
be far more effective than the stiffening of the law for the inºiction of
punishment.”70
C. United Nations General Assembly 71
The killing of twenty-eight people at Israel’s Lod airport in May
1972 and of eleven Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic Games in
September 1972 forced the General Assembly to confront the issue of
terrorism.72 No consensus on deªnition was reached because, inter
alia, some states supported the use of terrorism to advance political
goals.73 Furthermore, the United Nations maintained an institutional
commitment to self-determination that clouded its vision relating to
terrorism.74 States directly interested in national liberation sought to
exclude acts committed in such struggles from any deªnition of ter-
rorism. The polarization of positions resulting from the division of the
world into the West, the Soviet Bloc, and the Non-Aligned States ex-
acerbated the division over terrorism.75
                                                                                                                     
noted speculation that India’s ratiªcation was motivated by a desire to suppress nationalist
movements within India. Mani, supra note 53, at 207 n.4.
67 Responsibility for the treaty did not pass to the United Nations so it can be regarded
as no longer valid. See Nawaz & Singh, supra note 2, at 67.
68 See Thomas M. Franck & Bert B. Lockwood Jr., Preliminary Thoughts Towards an Inter-
national Convention on Terrorism, 68 Am. J. Int’l L. 69, 70 (1974).
69 Starke, supra note 41, at 215.
70 Id.
71 See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Terrorism: A Compilation of
U.N. Documents (1972–2001) (2002) (providing the text of the major U.N. resolutions
related to terrorism).
72 John Norton Moore, Towards Legal Restraints on International Terrorism, 67 Am. Soc’y
Int’l L. Proc. 88, 88 (1973).
73 See Abraham D. Sofaer, Terrorism and the Law, 64 Foreign Aff. 901, 903 (1986).
74 See U.N. Charter art. 1; José E. Alvarez, The U.N.’s ‘War’ on Terrorism, 31 Int’l J. Le-
gal Info. 238, 238 (2003); see also Moore, supra note 72, at 88 (arguing that there is no
necessary congruence between the pursuit of self-determination and terrorism).
75 See van Krieken, supra note 16, at tit. page, 114; G.A. Res. 3034, supra note 48 (an
early resolution on terrorism which was a product of the Western states’ view that all ter-
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Other attempts to ªnd a comprehensive approach to international
terrorism also achieved little. The General Assembly established an ad
hoc committee on terrorism in 1972, but its inconclusive debate failed
to make any signiªcant progress.76 The committee was suspended from
1973 until 1976, during which time responsibility for the terrorism is-
sue fell to the General Assembly’s Sixth Legal Committee.77
There was no shortage of draft conventions at the United Nations.
For example, the United States tabled a draft Convention for the Pre-
vention and Punishment of Certain Acts of International Terrorism78
that did not deªne terrorism but instead instructed states to criminalize
offenses of “international signiªcance.” These were deªned as (1) acts
performed with intent to “damage the interests of or obtain conces-
sions from a State or an international organization,” (2) involving the
unlawful killing, the causing of serious bodily harm, or the kidnapping
of another person, (3) that are “committed neither by nor against a
member of the armed forces of a state in the course of military hostili-
ties,” and (4) are international in character.
The strength of national liberation movements and the solidarity
of recently liberated states with people under foreign rule affected
the conclusion of multilateral conventions as well. In 1979, Algeria
and Libya sought to create an exception to the Hostages Convention
that would allow hostage taking in the context of national liberation.79
Similarly, Syria argued that individual terrorism was only an interna-
tional concern when employed solely for personal gain.80 The debate
over the legitimacy of terrorism hampered the progress towards a
deªnition,81 although the end of the decolonization period largely
                                                                                                                     
rorism should be universally condemned, the Soviet states’ desire to establish a center for
terrorism studies within the U.N. Secretariat, and the Non-Aligned states’ wish to include a
reference to the legitimacy of struggles in pursuit of the right to self-determination against
racist, foreign, and colonial regimes).
76 See Nawaz & Singh, supra note 2, at 69.
77 Surya P. Sharma, International Law: Consensus Still Elusive, VII(2) World Focus,
(2000), reprinted in Encyclopaedia of International Terrorism: Terrorism: History
and Development 100–01 (Verinder Grover ed., 2002).
78 Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of Interna-
tional Terrorism, Sept. 25, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/L.850.
79 Suan Tiefenbrun, A Semiotic Approach to a Legal Deªnition of Terrorism, 9 ILSA J. Int’l
& Comp. L. 357, 388 (2003).
80 See Ad. Hoc. Comm. on Int’l Terrorism, General Assembly, Observations of States Submit-
ted in Accordance with General Assembly Resolution 3034 (XXVII), at 37, U.N. Doc. A/AC.160/
1/Add. 1 (May 16, 1973) [hereinafter Observations of States].
81 See, e.g., Press Release, Hasmy Agam (Malaysia), General Assembly, Speakers Call for
Comprehensive International Convention on Terrorism in General Assembly Debate, U.N.
Doc. GA/9922 (Oct. 2, 2001) (“Acts of pure terrorism, involving attacks against innocent
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settled the legitimacy issue.82 Others attribute the slow forming con-
sensus to states that support terrorism preferring to leave the
deªnition vague.83 The U.N. efforts to ªght terrorism have been de-
scribed as “almost totally useless.”84 Although this assessment over-
states the position, even within U.N. circles it is acknowledged that the
“lack of agreement on a clear and well-known deªnition undermines
the normative and moral stance [of the U.N. General Assembly]
against terrorism and has stained the United Nations image.”85
The end of the Cold War—and more signiªcantly, the withdrawal
of Soviet support for radical groups in the Middle East—allowed the
General Assembly to more categorically declare the illegitimacy of
terrorism in all circumstances.86 The decoupling of the right to self-
determination and terrorism was a signiªcant step forward.87 In con-
trast to the earlier conventions dealing with speciªc targets (for ex-
ample aircraft, marine vessels, and diplomats), the “second genera-
tion” agreements88 contain wider prohibitions and were concluded
under the United Nations’ auspices.89 Resolutions were unequivocal
in their condemnation.90 Another ad hoc committee was established
                                                                                                                     
civilian populations should be differentiated from legitimate struggles of peoples under
colonial, alien or foreign domination for self-determination and national liberation . . . .”);
Press Release, General Assembly, Calls for Resolute Action Against Terrorism Tempered in
Assembly by Appeals for Caution in Identifying ‘Enemy,’ U.N. Doc. GA/9962 (Nov. 12,
2001) (“It was unacceptable to label as terrorism the struggle of peoples to protect them-
selves or to attain their independence . . . .”).
82 Decolonization struggles still exist. The Israel-Palestinian dispute is often portrayed
in this way.
83 See Tiefenbrun, supra note 79, at 378.
84 Richard Clutterbuck, International Co-operation Against Terrorism—Treaties, Conventions
and Bilateral Agreements, in International Terrorism: Report from a Seminar Arranged
by the European Law Students’ Association 39, 45 (Magnus Sandbu & Peter Nordbak
eds., 1987).
85 The Secretary General, Report of the Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change, ¶ 159, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2,
2004) [hereinafter U.N. High-Level Panel].
86 Flory, supra note 40, at 18.
87 See G.A. Res. 44/29, at 301-02, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/29 (Dec. 4, 1989) (referring to
the right to self-determination, yet offering an unqualiªed condemnation of terrorism).
88 See José E. Alvarez, Hegemonic International Law Revisited, 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 873, 876
(2003) [hereinafter Hegemonic International Law Revisited].
89 This is distinguished from other terrorism conventions, for example, which are de-
posited with the International Civil Aviation Organization. See Montreal Convention, supra
note 52; Montreal Airports Protocol, supra note 52.
90 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 49/60, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/60 (Dec. 9, 1994). While in 1991, U.N.
resolutions still included references to national liberation movements (see, e.g., G.A. Res.
46/51, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/51 (Dec. 9, 1991)) by 1994, these references were no
longer included. See, e.g., id.; see also G.A. Res. 55/158, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/158 ( Jan. 30,
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in 199691 to continue developing treaties criminalizing terrorism-
related acts. The General Assembly’s most signiªcant resolution to
date, the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terror-
ism of 1994 (Elimination Declaration), states that:
2. Acts, methods and practices of terrorism constitute a grave
violation of the purposes and principles of the United Na-
tions, which may pose a threat to international peace and se-
curity, jeopardize friendly relations among States, hinder in-
ternational cooperation and aim at the destruction of hu-
man rights, fundamental freedoms and the democratic bases
of society;
3. Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of
terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular
persons for political purposes are in any circumstance un-
justiªable, whatever the considerations of a political, philo-
sophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other
nature that may be invoked to justify them . . . . 92
Paragraph 3 repeats but augments the deªnition in the 1937 Ter-
rorism Convention that was drafted under the auspices of the League
of Nations. The Elimination Declaration was endorsed annually in
subsequent resolutions.93 The context indicates that paragraph 3 of
the Elimination Declaration expands on paragraph 2. Under the ap-
proach adopted by the Elimination Declaration and the conventions,
the label of terrorism provides an additional “layer of criminality”94
and signals greater moral culpability. This deªnitional statement re-
quires mens rea with respect to the criminal act’s consequences and
excludes any possible justiªcation for the act. Resolutions of the Gen-
                                                                                                                     
2001); G.A. Res. 54/110, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/110 (Feb. 2, 2000); G.A. Res. 53/108, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/53/108 ( Jan. 26, 1999); G.A. Res. 52/165, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/165 ( Jan. 19,
1998).
91 See G.A. Res. 56/88, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/88 ( Jan 24, 2002) (continuing the
mandate provided in Resolution 51/210); G.A. Res. 51/210, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/210
(Dec. 17, 1996).
92 G.A. Res. 49/60, supra note 90.
93 G.A. Res. 57/27, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/27 ( Jan. 15, 2003); G.A. Res. 56/88,
supra note 91, ¶ 10; G.A. Res. 55/158, supra note 90, ¶ 9; G.A. Res. 54/110, supra note 90,
¶ 7; G.A. Res. 53/108, supra note 90, ¶ 8; G.A. Res. 52/165, supra note 90, ¶ 7; G.A. Res.
51/210, supra note 91, ¶¶ 7–8, Annex; G.A. Res. 50/53, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/53
( Jan. 29, 1996).
94 Noteboom, supra note 36, at 564.
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eral Assembly do not make law per se, although they can evidence the
opinions of states and be declarative of law.95
Following the increased Security Council management of the
United Nations’ anti-terrorism strategy after September 11, the General
Assembly continued to adopt resolutions calling on states to eliminate
international terrorism.96 The Sixth Legal Committee did not incorpo-
rate the obligations arising from Resolution 1373 into its recent draft
Comprehensive Terrorism Convention.97 Although duplicating Resolu-
tion 1373’s provisions is arguably unnecessary, the exclusion of them
may indicate some tension between the General Assembly and the Se-
curity Council concerning the United Nations’ management of its anti-
terrorism efforts. The General Assembly’s composition makes it unsur-
prising that even in the wake of September 11 it failed to achieve clarity
of vision sufªcient to produce anything new and constructive.98 Illus-
trating the vexed nature of deªning terrorism, the Council of Europe—
a more homogenous and harmonious congress than the General As-
sembly—also failed to reach a deªnitional consensus in the context of
European Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism.99
In late 2004, the Secretary-General of the United Nations pre-
sented the report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change to the General Assembly, which was compiled by a panel of
experts appointed by the Secretary-General.100 Amongst a wide range
of other topics, the report recommended that the General Assembly
should complete negotiations on a comprehensive convention on ter-
rorism.101 In addition to this direction, however, the report recom-
mended that the deªnition (1) restate that the acts proscribed by the
twelve global terrorism conventions constitute acts of terrorism and
declare that such acts are crimes at international law and (2) refer to
the deªnitions in the Financing Convention and Resolution 1566.102
Noteworthy is the conclusion implicit in the report that the Financing
                                                                                                                     
95 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 187–95, 203–05
( June 27); Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 14 (5th ed. 1998).
96 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 56/88, supra note 91.
97 Infra note 184.
98 Contra van Krieken, supra note 16, at 119 (expressing surprise that so little was
achieved).
99 Eur. Consult., European Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism Explanatory Report,
ETS No. 090, ¶ 14 (1977), available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/
HTML/090.htm.
100 U.N. High-Level Panel, supra note 85, ¶ 2.
101 Id. ¶ 159.
102 Id. ¶ 164.
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Convention and Resolution 1566 provide deªnitions of terrorism.103
More important, however, is the suggestion that acts of terrorism
(however deªned) should be illegal at international law. This appears
to advocate for a change in direction from the current approach of
using international law to declare that certain acts should be criminal-
ized in the domestic law of each signatory state.104 Whether this ap-
proach will be given serious consideration is unclear at present.
D. United Nations Security Council
The Security Council is authorized by Articles 25 and 48 of the
U.N. Charter to adopt resolutions that bind U.N. member states. Ter-
rorism is almost certainly within the Security Council’s province and
the Council proclaimed it one of the “most serious threats to peace and
security,”105 thereby invoking its powers under Chapter VII of the Char-
ter.106 Following September 11, the Security Council focused on terror-
ism’s domestic and international manifestations.107 Resolution 1368
condemned the terrorist attacks and, foreshadowing Resolution 1373,
called on the international community to “redouble their efforts to
prevent and suppress terrorist acts including by increased cooperation
and full implementation of the relevant international anti-terrorism
conventions.”108
Resolution 1373, adopted on September 28, 2001, is the ªrst use
of Chapter VII powers to order states to take or refrain from speciªc
actions other than when disciplining a speciªc country.109 For Resolu-
tion 1373, the Security Council largely adopted existing obligations
from the Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terror-
ism (Financing Convention) and the General Assembly’s Elimination
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104 Id. ¶ 164(b).
105 S.C. Res. 1566, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 (Oct. 8, 2004) (stating international
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108 S.C. Res. 1368, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001).
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Declaration of 1994.110 Indeed, working from a blank slate would have
been slower and would have denied the Security Council the advan-
tage of capturing the legitimacy of obligations that many states had
already accepted by signing the Financing Convention.
Resolution 1373 seeks to encourage governments to take action
against terrorists by, inter alia, imposing signiªcant obligations on states
to enact domestic legislation. Paragraph 1(b) declares that “all States
shall . . . [c]riminalize” the raising of funds and ªnancing of terrorist
acts.111 It requires tightened border controls, mutual assistance in
criminal investigations or proceedings, and the denial of safe haven.
Furthermore, it calls upon states to exchange information, to cooper-
ate on prevention, and to become party to relevant conventions and
protocols and implement them. Pursuant to paragraph 2, states are also
required to “[r]efrain from providing any form of support, active or
passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts, including sup-
pressing recruitment of members of terrorist groups and eliminating
the supply of weapons to terrorists.” Signiªcantly, states are also re-
quired to “[e]nsure that any person who participates in the ªnancing,
planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting
terrorist acts is brought to justice and ensure that, in addition to any
other measures against them, such terrorist acts are established as seri-
ous criminal offences in domestic laws . . . .”112
Resolution 1373 established the Counter-Terrorism Committee
(C.T.C.),113 which monitors the implementation of the obligations
under Resolution 1373 and provides assistance to states as required.
The onerous obligations imposed by Resolution 1373 and monitored
by the C.T.C. are of the variety “usually contained only in treaties de-
veloped through the normal treaty-making process.”114 Resolution
1373 departs from the normal language of “calls upon” and “urges”
and instead issues mandatory directions in a style characteristic of leg-
islation, such as “all States shall . . . .”115 Classical international law,
built on state sovereignty and its corollary of state consent,116 denied
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all entities the power to legislate for states.117 Professor Jose Alvarez
argues that Resolution 1373 illustrates the hegemonic nature of con-
temporary international law.118
Resolution 1373, despite forty references to terrorism or terror-
ists (including twenty-nine in operative paragraphs) and their invasive
and instructive nature, does not deªne either term. Signiªcantly, in
selecting certain parts of the Financing Convention to make manda-
tory, the Security Council chose not to replicate the Financing Con-
vention’s deªnition of terrorist act. The C.T.C. has said that it will not
attempt to deªne the term119 and thus Resolution 1373 has left states
free to deªne “terrorism” as each regards appropriate. This omission
permits divergent implementation of Resolution 1373’s many obliga-
tions that turn on how terrorism is deªned. Not until October of
2004—three years after Resolution 1373 imposed its mandatory obli-
gations—did the Security Council give a clear indication of how it
considers terrorism should be deªned.
In this respect, Resolution 1373 represents a lost opportunity.
Resolution 1373 could have comprehensively deªned terrorism or at
least codiªed the existing meaning of terrorism found in international
law. Instead the Resolution’s important obligations remained (and pos-
sibly still remain) subject to interpretative conjecture and vulnerable to
opportunistic and bad faith implementation. States with dubious hu-
man rights records actively suppress political opposition, curtail civil
and political rights, or simply continue human rights abuses under the
new pretext of taking the required steps to ªght terrorism.120 Reports
to the C.T.C. conªrm this disturbing trend.121 Whether the United
States’ political capital post-September 11 was sufªcient for it to press
for a deªnition—no doubt styled with its own pen—is unclear. The ab-
sence of an articulated deªnition in Resolution 1373 does not, however,
completely undermine the operation of the obligations if this Article’s
                                                                                                                     
117 See Szasz, supra note 109, at 901.
118 Hegemonic International Law Revisited, supra note 88, at 875 (developing on Detlev F.
Vagts, Hegemonic International Law, 95 Am. J. Int’l L. 843 (2001)).
119 Jeremy Greenstock, Chairman, Counter-Terrorism Comm. of the Sec. Coun-
cil, Presentation at the U.N. Symposium: Combating international Terrorism: The
Contribution of the United Nations ( June 3, 2002), available at http://www.un.org/
Docs/sc/committees/1373/ViennaNotes.htm.
120 See Human Rights Watch, Opportunism in the Face of Tragedy: Repression in the Name of
Anti-Terrorism, http://hrw.org/campaigns/september11/opportunismwatch.htm (last visited
Oct. 18, 2005).
121 See, e.g., S.C. Letter, Report of the Republic of Cuba Submitted Pursuant to Para-
graph 6 of Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), Annex 1, U.N. Doc. S/2002/15 ( Jan.
9, 2002) (reporting Cuba’s response).
2006] Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as a Legal Concept 45
thesis is accepted. The core deªnition of terrorism provides human
rights advocacy groups, governments, and other international actors
with a widely accepted yardstick to use in determining the legitimacy of
governments ªghting what is said to be terrorism.
Resolution 1566, unanimously approved by the Security Council in
October 2004, remedies the absence of a deªnition in Resolution 1373
to some extent. Like previous Security Council and General Assembly
Resolutions, Resolution 1566 condemns terrorism in all its forms, irre-
spective of its motivation, and urges states to cooperate fully in the
“ªght against terrorism.” But paragraph 3 of Resolution 1566:
Recalls that criminal acts, including against civilians, commit-
ted with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or
taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of ter-
ror in the general public or in a group of persons or particu-
lar persons, intimidate a population or compel a government
or an international organization to do or to abstain from do-
ing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and
as deªned in the international conventions and protocols re-
lating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justiªable by
considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial,
ethnic, religious or other similar nature . . . .122
On its face, this appears to be a deªnition of terrorism. Accord-
ing to a Security Council press release, Ambassador Ronaldo Mota
Sardenberg of Brazil stated to the Security Council during its debate
of Resolution 1566 that operative paragraph 3 was not an attempt to
deªne the concept of terrorism but rather a compromise among the
Member States that contained a clear political message.123 But over
time, paragraph 3 is likely to be recognized as the Security Council’s
deªnition of terrorism, de facto, if not de jure. It is important to note,
however, that the deªnition is qualiªed by the phrase “which consti-
tute offenses within the scope of and as deªned in the international
conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.” Thus, the most
signiªcant of the Security Council statements on terrorism can be
read to support the notion that terrorism is the aggregate of the exist-
ing deªnitions of terrorism in the conventions.
                                                                                                                     
122 S.C. Res. 1566, supra note 105, ¶ 3.
123 Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Acts Unanimously to Adopt Resolu-
tion Strongly Condemning Terrorism as One of Most Serious Threats to Peace, U.N. Doc.
SC/8214 (Oct. 8, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/
sc8214.doc.htm.
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It is not clear from what point in its history this deªnition is re-
called. Previous Security Council resolutions, as discussed above, have
not come close to a deªnition exhibiting such speciªcity. Resolution
1566 avoids the contentious issue of whether military targets can be
the subject of terrorist attacks by deªning the class of victims as “in-
cluding . . . civilians,” thereby implying further targets fall within the
deªnition. Such targets might include political and state leaders, de-
pending on who is regarded as a civilian, but most likely provides
plausible grounds for arguing that the deªnition includes attacks on
military targets as acts of terrorism. Ambassador Jack Danforth of the
United States, in his statement to the Security Council, strongly im-
plied that the paragraph 3 deªnition is not exhaustive, that other ter-
rorists acts occur, and that nothing in paragraph 3 should be read as
indicating anything to the contrary.124
Irrespective of the intention of the Security Council and whether
the deªnition is exhaustive or otherwise, Resolution 1566’s deªnition is
an important pronouncement and should be read as partially ªlling the
gap in Resolution 1373. The pronouncement, however, remains subject
to the legitimate criticism that because it endorses a deªnition of ter-
rorism ascertainable from the conventions, it adds little new to the de-
velopment of terrorism as a legal concept. Nevertheless, Resolution
1566, although not of law-making force,125 goes some way to clarifying
the extent of the obligations in Resolution 1373, and, for this reason, it
is signiªcant. The three year delay in imposing various anti-terrorism
obligations on states and providing what states might well come to re-
gard as the Security Council’s deªnition of terrorism is unfortunate to
the extent that most states have discharged their obligations and have
already delineated what each considers terrorism to be.
E. Multilateral Anti-Terrorism Conventions and Protocols126
Prior to September 11, the General Assembly had effectively dele-
gated its terrorism responsibilities to the Sixth Legal Committee. The
Committee (as well as international organizations such as the Interna-
                                                                                                                     
124 Id.
125 See, e.g., id.
126 United Nations, International Instruments related to the Prevention and
Suppression of International Terrorism (2001); Bassiouni, Multilateral Conven-
tions, supra note 6 (containing conventions and protocols). International law refers to
binding international agreements by a variety of names: conventions, charters, treaties,
and covenants. Jan Klabbers, The Concept of Treaty in International Law 42–44
(1996). This Article refers to treaties and conventions interchangeably.
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tional Civil Aviation Organization) developed treaties that encouraged
states to criminalize some of those acts commonly carried out by terror-
ists (such as airplane hijackings) and provided for comprehensive ju-
risdiction combined with a duty to prosecute or extradite.127 Other
conventions seek to restrict terrorists’ access to resources. The thirteen
multilateral conventions deal with both punishment and prevention
across disparate subject areas. Technological advancement necessitated
“prevention conventions” that curb the availability of weapons of mass
destruction and unmarked plastic explosives.128
The punishment conventions proscribe conduct and, broadly
speaking, deªne the following crimes: physical attacks on internation-
ally protected persons and their (and their government’s) property;129
the seizure of hostages to compel third parties to act in a certain
way;130 the use of explosive or other lethal devices against public tar-
gets with the intention to cause death, serious injury, or major eco-
nomic loss;131 the unlawful possession of radioactive material with the
intention to cause death or serious injury or the unlawful use of such
material with the intention to cause death, serious bodily injury, sub-
stantial property or environmental damage, or to compel a person,
organization, or state to do or not do something;132 jeopardizing the
safety of a civil aviation aircraft or persons or property onboard;133
gaining control of a civil aviation aircraft by use or threat of force or
intimidation;134 doing things that endanger the safety of a civil avia-
tion aircraft;135 acts of violence that cause serious injury or death or
endanger safety at a civil aviation airport;136 the threat or use of nu-
clear material that causes or is likely to cause serious injury, death, or
property damage;137 and gaining control over a vessel or ªxed mari-
                                                                                                                     
127 But see e.g., John F. Murphy, Civil Liability for the Commission of International Crimes as
an Alternative to Criminal Prosecution, 12 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 1 (1999) (citing an example of
an alternative approach).
128 The one reported deadly use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists is the re-
lease of sarin gas in the subway in Tokyo, Japan, in 1995. It caused twelve deaths and many
people were injured. See Joby Warrick, An Easier, but Less Deadly Recipe for Terror, Wash.
Post, Dec. 31, 2004.
129 Internationally Protected Persons Convention, supra note 52, art. 2(1)(a), (b).
130 Hostages Convention, supra note 52, art. 1(1).
131 Bombings Convention, supra note 52, art. 2(1).
132 Nuclear Terrorism Convention, supra note 51, art. 2(1)(a), (b).
133 Tokyo Convention, supra note 52, art. 1(1)(b).
134 The Hague Convention, supra note 52, art. 1(a).
135 Montreal Convention, supra note 52, art. 1(1).
136 Montreal Airports Protocol, supra note 52, art. II(1).
137 Nuclear Materials Convention, supra note 52, art. 7(1).
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time platform by threat, force, or intimidation or endangering the
safe navigation of the vessel or ªxed maritime platform.138
Despite not necessarily referring to terrorism expressly, these
conventions139 and their prohibitions are intended to address terror-
ism. International politics necessitates the incremental criminalization
of acts of terrorism, and some agreement on which acts should be
proscribed was better than no progress. The Financing Convention,
and General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, and state-
ments by other international law actors140 make a sufªcient link be-
tween the conventions and the goal of addressing terrorism such that
the conventions are very relevant to determining the deªnition of
terrorism at international law.
1. The Punishment Conventions
The international anti-terrorism instruments tend to require
speciªc prohibitions in domestic law but leave states signiªcant lati-
tude in implementing their international obligations. The conven-
tions generally follow a basic model: a type of terrorist activity of par-
ticular concern at the time is identiªed; states are obliged to criminal-
ize this conduct and impose penalties proportional to the act; and
states are required to establish jurisdiction at least based on territory,
nationality, and place of registration (and in some cases more exten-
                                                                                                                     
138 Maritime Convention, supra note 52, art. 3(1) (vessels); Fixed Platforms Conven-
tion, supra note 52, art. 2(1).
139 Other relevant international instruments also play a role in international counter-
terrorism efforts, although are not exclusively focused on terrorist acts; see Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and
on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45; Conven-
tion on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 11; Convention on the
Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, Dec. 9, 1994, S. Treaty Doc. No. 107-1,
34 I.L.M. 482; Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpil-
ing of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Dec. 16,
1971, 26 U.S.T. 583, 11 I.L.M. 309; Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Jul.
1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter Non-Proliferation Treaty]. See also Gen-
eral Assembly, Report of the Ad-Hoc Committee Established by General Assembly Resolution 51/210 of
17 December 1996, 6th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/57/37 ( Jan. 28- Feb. 1, 2002), available at http://
daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/248/17/PDF/N0224817.pdf?OpenElement.
[hereinafter Draft Comprehensive Terrorism Convention].
140 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 44/29, supra note 87 (evidencing the link between the listed con-
ventions and terrorism by referring to the “existing international conventions relating to
various aspects of the problem of international terrorism, viz . . . .” naming all those Con-
vention mentioned in, supra note 52 passed before 1989). See also G.A. Res. 46/51, supra
note 90; S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 42, pmbl.; Financing Convention, supra note 52, art.
2(1)(a), Annex.
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sively). The following brief survey pays particular attention to how the
conventions’ prohibitions and other features relate to the content of
the deªnition of terrorism.
Following the frequent hijackings of the 1960s, the Convention on
Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (Tokyo
Convention) (1963), the Convention for the Suppression of the Unlaw-
ful Seizure of Aircraft (The Hague Convention) (1970), and the Con-
vention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation (Montreal Convention) (1971) were adopted under pressure
from the International Civil Aviation Organization to attempt to secure
the safety of civil aviation.141
The Tokyo Convention establishes a system for allocating jurisdic-
tion over offenses concerning aircraft, rather than deªning particular
offenses.142 “Offenses” are not deªned. By contrast, The Hague Con-
vention makes it an offense to “unlawfully, by force or threat thereof, or
by any form of intimidation, seize[], or exercise[] control” of a civilian
aircraft.143 The Montreal Convention provides for further offenses, in-
cluding acts of violence against persons, damaging aircraft, placing sub-
stances likely to destroy or seriously damage aircraft, and damaging or
interfering with navigational facilities in a way likely to endanger the
safety of an aircraft.144 States have a duty under each of these conven-
tions to criminalize the conventions’ speciªed conduct.145 A protocol to
the Montreal Convention requires states to criminalize acts of violence
or destruction of property committed at international airports serving
civil aviation.146
The Internationally Protected Persons Convention (1973) is struc-
turally similar to The Hague and Montreal Conventions.147 It deªnes an
“internationally protected person” as a head of state functionary, head
of government, Minister of Foreign Affairs, their families, and other
representatives of states and international organizations.148 It requires
states parties to criminalize murder, kidnapping, and other attacks on
                                                                                                                     
141 See Montreal Convention, supra note 52; The Hague Convention, supra note 52;
Tokyo Convention, supra note 52.
142 Tokyo Convention, supra note 52.
143 The Hague Convention, supra note 52, art. 1(a).
144 Montreal Convention, supra note 52, art. 1.
145 Id. arts.1, 3; The Hague Convention, supra note 52, arts. 2, 4.
146 Montreal Airports Protocol, supra note 52, art. II.
147 Internationally Protected Persons Convention, supra note 52.
148 Id. art. 1.
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the liberty of such persons, as well as attacks upon their residences,
transport, and ofªcial premises.149
The International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages
(Hostages Convention) (1979)150 requires states to make a provision
in their domestic law for the crime of seizing, detaining, or threaten-
ing to kill, injure, or continue to detain another person in order to
compel a state, international intergovernmental organization, person,
juridical person, or group of persons to do or abstain from doing an
act explicitly or implicitly conditioned on release of the hostage.151
Offenses similar to those required under The Hague and Mont-
real Conventions are also required with respect to ships (other than
police or war ships)152 by the Convention for the Suppression of Un-
lawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (Maritime Con-
vention) (1988). States are required to criminalize the seizing of, or
the exercising of control over, a ship using force or intimidation; per-
forming acts of violence on a ship or causing damage that is likely to
endanger the safe navigation of the ship; placing devices or sub-
stances on board a ship that are likely to destroy the ship, damage it
or its cargo, or endanger its safe navigation; and destroying or seri-
ously damaging maritime navigational facilities.153 A protocol effec-
tively extends the Maritime Convention to apply to ªxed platforms on
the continental shelf.154
In 1998, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the International
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (Bombing Con-
vention).155 This convention speciªcally acknowledges that the existing
multilateral conventions are insufªcient to address terrorism.156 In 2002
bombings accounted for 70% of the world’s terrorist attacks.157 The
                                                                                                                     
149 Id. art. 2(1)(a), (b).
150 Hostage taking is a crime under international humanitarian law during armed
conºict not of an international character. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 34, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
[hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].
151 Hostages Convention, supra note 52, arts. 1, 2.
152 Maritime Convention, supra note 52, arts. 1, 2.
153 Id. arts. 3(1), 5.
154 See id.
155 See G.A. Res. 52/164, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/164 ( Jan. 9, 1998). The United
States initiated negotiations leading to the Convention in July 1996 following the bomb-
ings of U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and of the Khober Towers in Saudi Arabia.
Bassiouni, Multilateral Conventions, supra note 6, at 173.
156 Bombings Convention, supra note 52, Annex (“Noting also that existing multilat-
eral legal provisions do not adequately address these attacks . . . .”).
157 See U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 6, at intro.
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Bombings Convention broadly prohibits the use of explosives and other
lethal weapons. States must provide for the offenses listed in the Bomb-
ings Convention in domestic law.158 The ease of manufacturing destruc-
tive devices and their frequent use by terrorists explains the Bombings
Convention’s far-reaching requirements. Application of this conven-
tion’s prohibitions to armed forces during armed conºict is expressly
excluded.159 Article 2(1), the principal offense provision, reads:
Any person commits an offence . . . if that person unlawfully
and intentionally delivers, places, discharges or detonates an
explosive or other lethal device in, into or against a place of
public use, a State or government facility, a public transpor-
tation system or an infrastructure facility:
(a) With the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury;
or
(b) With the intent to cause extensive destruction of such
a place, facility or system, where such destruction results in
or is likely to result in major economic loss.160
And by Article 5, mirroring the General Assembly’s Elimination Dec-
laration of 1994 quoted above, the Bombings Convention states:
Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be neces-
sary, including, where appropriate, domestic legislation, to en-
sure that criminal acts within the scope of this Convention, in
particular where they are intended or calculated to provoke a
state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or
particular persons, are under no circumstances justiªable by
considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial,
ethnic, religious or other similar nature and are punished by
penalties consistent with their grave nature.161
On September 14, 2005 the International Convention for the
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (Nuclear Terrorism Conven-
tion) was opened for signature. This convention requires states to
criminalize162 the unlawful and intentional possession of radioactive
material or devices (both as deªned) and the making of such devices
                                                                                                                     
158 Bombings Convention, supra note 52, art. 4(a); see also Nuclear Terrorism Conven-
tion, supra note 51, at pmbl.
159 Id. art. 19(2).
160 Bombings Convention, supra note 52, art. (2)(1).
161 Id. art. 5.
162 Nuclear Terrorism Convention, supra note 51, art. 2(l)(a)
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with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm or substantial
damage to property or the environment.163 It also requires criminaliza-
tion of the use of radioactive material or devices or the use of or dam-
age to a nuclear facility which releases or risks the release of radioactive
material with the intent to cause death, serious bodily injury, substantial
damage to property or the environment, or to compel a person, inter-
national organization, or state to do or refrain from doing an act. Al-
though similar to other punishment conventions, the Nuclear Terror-
ism Convention refers to environmental damage as well as to humans
and property.
2. The Prevention Conventions
A second class of conventions seeks to prevent terrorism, or at
least to mitigate its impact, by denying terrorists materials, ªnance,
support, and equipment. The Convention on the Physical Protection
of Nuclear Material (Nuclear Materials Convention) (1980)164 relates
to the international transportation and storage of nuclear material.165
For the purposes of this Article, however, the Nuclear Materials Con-
vention contributes little to the deªnitional debate, as it applies to all
entities handling such materials and not speciªcally to terrorism.166
The Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose
of Detection (1991), the ªrst of the conventions to use the word “ter-
rorism,”167 also seeks to limit the availability of materials to terrorists
by requiring states to prohibit and prevent the manufacture of un-
marked explosives.168
The Financing Convention, adopted by General Assembly resolu-
tion in 1999,169 seeks to eliminate terrorism by cutting off funding
streams, noting that the “number and seriousness of acts of interna-
tional terrorism depend on the ªnancing that terrorists may ob-
tain.”170 It builds on obligations in previous General Assembly state-
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164 Nuclear Materials Convention, supra note 52, art. 2.
165 See Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 139, (limiting the availability of nuclear ma-
terial and facilitating the application of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s stan-
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166 See Nuclear Materials Convention, supra note 52, art. 7(1).
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ments.171 It is the ªrst international convention since 1937, however,
to attempt to deªne terrorism in the abstract. Its offense provision
implies this deªnition:172
1. Any person commits an offence . . . if that person by any
means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and willfully, pro-
vides or collects funds with the intention that they should be
used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or
in part, in order to carry out:
(a) An act which constitutes an offence within the scope of
and as deªned in one of the treaties listed in the annex;[173]
or
(b) Any other act intended to cause death or serious bod-
ily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an
active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conºict,
when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to
intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an
international organization to do or to abstain from doing
any act.
F. Thematic Content of the Concept of Terrorism at International Law
This section examines the themes and common elements present
in the terrorism conventions and the overlap of their prohibitions.
Stating these themes abstractly identiªes the constituent parts of ter-
rorism as a legal concept at international law and helps to establish
the parameters of the deªnition of terrorism. Nine themes are exam-
ined below.
1. The Harm Caused
Causing the death of or serious bodily injury to non-combatant
civilians is a proscribed outcome under the Bombings, Financing, and
                                                                                                                     
171 See generally G.A. Res. 51/210, supra note 91, ¶ 3(f); see also G.A. Res. 52/165, supra
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Nuclear Terrorism Conventions. The other conventions’ prohibitions
support the principle that killing or harming civilians is terrorism,
though their prohibitions apply only in certain contexts (for example,
in civil aviation airports or on ships).174 Causing death or serious bod-
ily injuries is also encompassed by the deªnition in paragraph 3 of
Security Council Resolution 1566,175 although not only civilians may
be the target of terrorists’ attacks under this deªnition.
The standard appears to be “serious bodily injury,” a term used in
the Financing Convention,176 Bombings Convention,177 Nuclear Terror-
ism Convention,178 Montreal Airports Protocol,179 and Security Council
Resolution 1566.180 Although the Maritime Convention and Fixed Plat-
forms Protocol refer simply to “injuries,” and the Montreal Convention
refers only to “violence against persons,” the protection of civilians is
not the principal aim of these conventions. Rather, injury or death is
only prohibited under these conventions if it is likely to endanger safe
navigation, or if the injuries or deaths occur while a prohibited act
(such as seizing control of a ship or airplane) is being performed. In
contrast, the Bombings Convention, Nuclear Terrorism Convention,
Resolution 1566, and (to a lesser extent) the Financing Convention
are, inter alia, directly concerned with harm to civilians. Any injuries
caused in the commission of an otherwise prohibited act sufªces as an
additional illegal act. Injuries generally must be serious in nature to
independently constitute terrorism. Although of less direct relevance,
the current draft Comprehensive Convention on Interna- tional Ter-
rorism181 refers to serious bodily injury. Injuries must be physical; men-
tal harm is insufªcient.
                                                                                                                     
174 Maritime Convention, supra note 52, art. 3(1); Montreal Airports Protocol, supra
note 52, art. II.
175 S.C. Res. 1566, supra note 105.
176 Bombings Convention, supra note 52, art. 2(1)(a).
177 Financing Convention, supra note 52, art. 2(1)(b).
178 Nuclear Terrorism Convention, supra note 51, art. 2(1)(a)(i), (1)(b)(i).
179 Montreal Airports Protocol, supra note 52, art. II(1).
180 S.C. Res. 1566, supra note 105, ¶ 3.
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deªnition of terrorism in clause (2)(1) of the Draft Comprehensive Terrorism Convention is:
Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that
person, by any means, unlawfully and intentionally, causes:
(a) Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or
(b) Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public
use, a State or government facility, a public transportation system, an infrastruc-
ture facility or the environment; or
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Unlike in previous conventions and the more recent Nuclear Ter-
rorism Convention, damage to property is not a proscribed harm under
the Financing Convention. Nor did the Security Council include such
damage in its recent effort to deªne terrorism in Resolution 1566. Sta-
tistically, attacks on private property are signiªcant. On average 298
business facilities were struck annually between 1997 and 2002, com-
pared with thirty-one diplomatic facilities, sixteen governmental, forty-
three military, and ninety other facilities.182 The Bombings Convention
contemplates damage to places of public use, state facilities, and public
transport systems or infrastructure where it causes or is likely to cause
economic harm. Damage to property with respect to ships and airplanes
is covered by the maritime and the civil aviation conventions, which
evince a concern for the consequences of the prohibited acts beyond
their harm to private property. Whether property is privately or publicly
owned is not determinative; the criterion is public use, not ownership.
The Nuclear Terrorism Convention is broader again and refers only to
“substantial damage to property or to the environment.”183 Although
the aviation and maritime conventions do not expressly condition prop-
erty damage on detrimental economic consequences, the aviation con-
ventions in particular grew out of a concern for conªdence in safe air
travel. Economic consequences were, at minimum, a relevant considera-
tion indicating that harm to property is only considered sufªciently wor-
risome if it causes major economic damage.
Pure economic loss (such as a depreciation in share value follow-
ing a terrorist attack) does not sufªce under any convention. In the
1970s, property damage was excluded, for example, from the U.S.
draft, as a concession to the Non-Aligned States that were wary of pro-
tecting foreign owned property abroad.184 Western states, however,
argued strongly for the inclusion of property damage, especially to
transportation systems,185 and this argument has won out, though not
to the extent of pure economic loss.
                                                                                                                     
(c) Damage to property, places, facilities, or systems referred to in para-
graph 1 (b) of this article, resulting or likely to result in major economic loss,
when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a
population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to
do or abstain from doing any act.
Id.
182 See U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 6, app. H.
183 Nuclear Terrorism Convention, supra note 51, art. 2(1)(a)(ii).
184 Franck & Lockwood, supra note 68, at 76.
185 Id. (citing Observations of States , supra note 80, at 17).
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2. The Criminal Status of the Act Causing Harm
A number of the conventions require acts to be independently
“unlawful” to contravene their provisions (see the Bombings, Financ-
ing, Nuclear Terrorism, The Hague, Montreal, and Maritime Conven-
tions and the Fixed Platforms Protocol).186 Independent unlawfulness,
presumably a reference to applicable domestic law, is implicit in the
other conventions too. For example, the deprivation of liberty of an
internationally protected person, prohibited by the Internationally Pro-
tected Persons Convention, must be restricted to unlawful detention to
render results that are not absurd. Some circumstances might warrant
detention of such persons. “Unlawful acts” is a broader standard than
that used in Resolution 1566, the Elimination Declaration, and Article
5 of the Bombings Convention (and the 1937 Terrorism Convention)
which refer to “criminal acts.”187 The “unlawful” standard is appropriate
for the core international deªnition, as the conventions are more
speciªc than the Elimination Declaration (which is largely aspirational)
and the repeat of the Elimination Declaration’s wording in Article 5 of
the Bombings Convention.188 Furthermore, the conventions are much
more persuasive as a source of law than the Elimination Declaration,
which is soft law, and the Security Council’s Resolution 1566, which is
not stated as a binding deªnition.
3. Intimidation or Coercion
Subclause 2(1)(b) of the Financing Convention requires that the
harm be done “when the purpose of such [an] act, by its nature or con-
text” is to intimidate a population or coerce a government or interna-
tional organization.189 Intimidation or coercion of some description,
also expressly required by the Hostages and Nuclear Materials Conven-
tions and Resolution 1566, is implicit in the other conventions and in-
herent in the concept of terrorism. For example, the protection of gov-
ernmental and international organizations’ staff190 derives partly from
the need to protect their principals’ freedom of action. Similarly, the
civil aviation—and probably the maritime—conventions are under-
pinned by a concern for the coercion and intimidation of states and
groups of persons.
                                                                                                                     
186 See also Draft Comprehensive Terrorism Convention, supra note 139, cl. 2(1).
187 See S.C. Res. 1566, supra note 105, ¶ 3.
188 See Bombings Convention, supra note 52, art. 5.
189 See Financing Convention, supra note 52.
190 Internationally Protected Persons Convention, supra note 52.
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Although not required by the Bombings Convention’s principal
prohibition in Article 2, Article 5 requires states to adopt measures to
ensure criminal acts contrary to the Bombings Convention are not
justiªable, “in particular where they are intended or calculated to pro-
voke a state of terror.” Despite this, which might indicate a modiªcation
of the general prohibition, intimidation or coercion is not a require-
ment of the Bombings Convention. The case for excluding intimida-
tion and coercion from the international deªnition is bol- stered by the
Nuclear Terrorism Convention, which provides that intending to com-
pel an act using radioactive material is an alternative to, for example,
causing death. As an implicit requirement of the earlier conventions
and prominent feature of the Financing Convention, however, intimi-
dation or coercion should be regarded as a necessary element of terror-
ism as a legal concept at international law.
The use of the indeªnite article preceding population191 indicates
that intimidation of any state’s population or a part thereof is sufªcient.
The Hostages Convention’s wide class of entities that must not be made
the subject of compulsion (“a State, an international intergovernmen-
tal organization, a natural or juridical person, or a group of persons”) is
much broader than the other conventions, which are restricted to gov-
ernments or international organizations, thereby excluding, for exam-
ple, coercion of multinational corporations.
4. The Range of Victims Generally Includes Persons and Property
Over time this issue has become more, not less, complicated. In
1973, there was general consensus that only innocent persons could be
victims of terrorism, which Thomas M. Franck and Bert B. Lockwood
deªned as persons unconnected with the terrorist’s struggle.192 The
present position is that persons and property involved in armed conºict
are excluded from the conventions, and thus they cannot be the sub-
ject of terrorist attacks under international law.193 The aviation, Mari-
time, and Financing Conventions expressly exclude military and police
aircraft and ships. Other conventions refer to doing the proscribed acts
“without lawful excuse” or “unlawfully.” Placing a bomb in a situation of
                                                                                                                     
191 See, e.g., Financing Convention, supra note 52, art. 2(1)(b) (“Any other act . . . is to
intimidate a population.”).
192 Franck & Lockwood, supra note 68, at 80. See generally Observations of States, supra
note 80.
193 There is academic support for requiring that the victims of terrorism be innocents.
See, e.g., Benjamin Netanyahu, Deªning Terrorism, in Terrorism: How the West Can Win
7, 9 (Benjamin Netanyahu ed., 1986).
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armed conºict would not constitute an offense against the Bombings
Convention if the circumstances of an armed conºict would make the
placement “lawful.”194 Thus, one can conclude that terrorist acts di-
rected towards combatants do not ªt within the core deªnition of ter-
rorism at international law. It is notable that the deªnition in Resolu-
tion 1566 refers to the range of victims of terrorism as including civil-
ians, thereby avoiding the debate on terrorism directed against military
targets.
There is pressure from the United States to regard off-duty and
unarmed service personnel as non-combatants under the Draft Com-
prehensive Terrorism Convention that is currently being debated.195
Notwithstanding this debate, the scope of “non-combatant” is unclear.
Certain governmental ofªcials are expressly protected when overseas.196
Whether military leaders, businesses that manufacture weapons, civil-
ians employed in military enterprises, and so forth are protected is un-
clear. It is relatively clear, however, that only non-combatants may be
the subject of terrorism attacks at international law.
5. Motivation of the Attacker
The conventions are not limited by the attacker’s motivation. For
example, neither the Nuclear Terrorism Convention nor the Financing
Convention deªnition require a religious, political, or ideological mo-
tive, nor does Resolution 1566.197 Similarly, the Internationally Pro-
tected Persons Convention, which criminalizes intentional attacks
against certain persons, does not expressly require knowledge of the
person’s status. Although some states’ domestic law may imply this ad-
ditional mens rea element,198 it is not a requirement at international
law199 (although there is academic support for this being a necessary
                                                                                                                     
194 At the very least, there is a strong inference of the legality of killing combatants
under certain conditions arising from the Geneva Conventions, infra note 221. Whether
criminal law defenses (such as necessity) constitute lawful authorization of killings for the
purposes of the conventions, as implemented, is unclear.
195 See U.S. Department of Defense, Military Commission Instruction No. 2
(2003), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/mco/mci2.pdf. The
deªnition is asserted to be a “distillation . . . of customary international law.” Eugene R.
Fidell & Michael F. Noone in Military Commission Instructions Sourcebook 95
(2003).
196 See Internationally Protected Persons Convention, supra note 52, arts. 1, 2.
197 Financing Convention, supra note 52, art. 2.
198 Contra Internationally Protected Persons and Hostages Act, No. 6, § 7(a) (1982)
(Cook Islands).
199See generally Convention of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference on Combat-
ing International Terrorism, July 1, 1999, http://www.oic-un.org/26icfm/c.html [herein-
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element of terrorism).200 Such a motivation usefully separates terrorist
groups from organized crime and limits the parameters of the concept
of terrorism thereby reducing the potential for abuse by govern-
ments.201 Proving a higher motivation (such as political, ideological, or
religious) may make prosecutions unduly difªcult. Once the act and
the purpose elements are proven, the motivation is arguably irrele-
vant.202 Furthermore, incorporating motivation opens the vexing issues
of moral and political legitimacy that have severely hampered the
deªnitional debate in the past.203
6. Mens Rea Elements Are Relevant to Both the Commission of the
Act Itself and the Creation of the Intimidatory or Coercive
Consequences
Each act proscribed in the conventions requires some form of
mens rea, usually intent. For example, the Bombings Convention’s
prohibition in Article 2 refers to “intentionally” and the Financing
Convention to “willfully” and “intentionally” doing certain acts.204 The
Nuclear Terrorism, Internationally Protected Persons, Montreal, Nu-
clear Materials, and Maritime Conventions, the two Protocols, and
Resolution 1566 require the act of terrorism speciªed to be an in-
tended act.205
The Financing Convention also requires a form of desired fore-
sight with respect to the consequences of the act, stating “when the
purpose of [the proscribed act], by its nature or context, is to intimi-
date . . . .”206 Similarly, Resolution 1566 refers to acts done “with the
                                                                                                                     
after OIC]. Furthermore, in the debate concerning the Draft Comprehensive Terrorism
Convention, the OIC argued for the exclusion of acts done in the pursuance of liberation
struggles and proposed the following paragraphs to be included in the Draft Convention:
“Peoples’ struggle including armed struggle against foreign occupation, aggression, colo-
nialism, and hegemony, aimed at liberation and self-determination in accordance with the
principles of international law shall not be considered a terrorist crime.” Id.
200 See Tiefenbrun, supra note 79, at 362 (“The overriding purpose is a necessary ele-
ment of the deªnition”).
201 Commonwealth Secretariat, Draft Model Legislation on Measures to
Combat Terrorism 42 (2002).
202 Id.
203 Franck & Lockwood, supra note 68, at 78.
204 Bombings Convention, supra note 52; Financing Convention, supra note 52.
205 Fixed Platforms Convention, supra note 52; Maritime Convention, supra note 52;
Montreal Airports Protocol, supra note 52; Nuclear Materials Convention, supra note 52;
Internationally Protected Persons Convention, supra note 52; Montreal Convention, supra
note 52; S.C. Res. 1566, supra note 105.
206 Financing Convention, supra note 52, art. 2(1)(b).
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purpose to provoke a state of terror . . . [or] intimidate . . . .”207 Yet
the General Assembly’s Elimination Declaration and Article 5 of the
Bombings Convention refer to the “intended or calculated” formula-
tion, which ªrst appeared in the 1937 Terrorism Convention.208 Con-
strued contextually, the mens rea of “calculated” must be a standard
below intention. This broader formulation is attached to the creation
of terror (i.e. the consequences) not the commission of the act itself.
In this way, it is an additional mental element relating to the creation
of some special state of affairs. This is what differentiates terrorism
from everyday crimes. Hence, the international deªnition requires
ªrst that the act is intended and second that the consequences are
either intended or perhaps calculated.
7. The Conventions Are Primarily Concerned with International
Terrorism209
International efforts to eliminate terrorism largely relate to pre-
serving peace and security, and the friendly relations of states. There-
fore, bombings to intimidate one’s own citizenry might not come un-
der an international deªnition of terrorism, however worthy they may
be of condemnation. An increased international commitment to hu-
man rights, however, might provide a foundation for extending the
prohibition against intra-state targets. The need for protection of a
state’s population against its own state is pressing. Sources estimate that
more than 70 million people died during the twentieth century from
“state-sponsored terror-violence,” whereas 100,000 causalities resulted
from terror attacks by small groups or individuals.210 In the future, hu-
man rights norms may serve as the “internationalizing element.”211
Presently, such attacks do not come within the core deªnition.
Daniel Partan has argued that the aircraft hijacking and hostage-
taking prohibitions in the conventions relate more strongly to protect-
ing civilians than government.212 The protection of civilian popula-
                                                                                                                     
207 S.C. Res. 1566, supra note 105, art. 3.
208 Bombings Convention, supra note 52, art. 5; 1937 Terrorism Convention, supra note
57; G.A. Res. 49/60, supra note 90, Annex (I)(3).
209 Nuclear Terrorism Convention, supra note 51, art. 3; Bombings Convention, supra
note 52, art. 3; Maritime Convention, supra note 52, art. 4(1); Montreal Convention, supra
note 52, art. 4(2). But see id. art. 4 (listing limited exceptions to the general rule that the
convention is only concerned with international terrorism).
210 Bassiouni, Multilateral Conventions, supra note 6, at 46 (citations omitted).
211 See Daniel G. Partan, Terrorism: An International Law Offense, 19 Conn. L. Rev. 751,
763 (1987).
212 Id.
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tions, however, is more recent. Early hijackings and hostage-takings
were performed to compel governments, principally democratic ones,
to act in a certain way.213 Harm to civilians is the means not the end,
as recognized by, for example, the Financing Convention making
harm to civilians contingent on some intimidatory or coercive pur-
pose.214 The Bombings Convention does not condition harm to civil-
ians by means of bombings on intimidation but these attacks on civil-
ians are performed to pressure governments.215 Civil unrest and/or
the democratic process translate intimidation of the populous into
compelled governmental action. Because civilians are a sufªciently im-
portant means to coercing government (particularly in democracies),
the conventions protect them. Furthermore, under most, if not all,
legal systems, attacks on civilians are illegal whether or not they are
intended to compel a government to act. The conventions are not
needed to cement adherence to the prohibition against civilian mur-
der. Rather, the conventions exist to protect governments.216
8. All Multilateral Conventions Concern Terrorist Acts by Individuals
The conventions speak to individual, not state or group, conduct.
The Nuclear Terrorism, Financing, Maritime, The Hague, and Hostages
Conventions speak of “person,” and clearly individuals may perform acts
of terrorism. Whether state actors can commit acts of terrorism has
been, and remains, a contentious issue.217 Interestingly, Resolution 1566
avoids specifying what type of entities may engage in terrorism, whereas
the Nuclear Terrorism Convention expressly provides that the activities
                                                                                                                     
213 The Internationally Protected Persons Convention, supra note 52, art. 3, was also
designed to protect the governments for whom such protected persons worked.
214 Financing Convention, supra note 52, art. 2(1)(b).
215 The timing of the bombing in Madrid, which preceded the Spanish general elec-
tions, appears to have been planned to inºuence the election, particularly the position of
the then incumbent government, which supported the military measures against Iraq.
Tony Karon, Did Al-Qaeda Change Spain’s Regime?, Time, Mar. 15, 2004, available at www.
time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,601306,00.html.
216 See, e.g., Internationally Protected Persons Convention, supra note 52, pmbl. (“Hav-
ing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations concerning
the maintenance of international peace and security and the promotion of friendly rela-
tions and co-operation among States . . . .”); see also Financing Conventions, supra note 52,
pmbl.; Bombings Convention, supra note 52, pmbl.; Maritime Convention, supra note 52,
pmbl.; Hostages Convention, supra note 52, pmbl. (starting with similar language).
217 Walter, supra note 33, at 35. Certainly there is not universal agreement on exclud-
ing state acts from what constitutes terrorism. See, e.g., Zeidan, supra note 6, at 492–96.
Zeidan, at the time, was a Lebanese Diplomat at the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the
United Nations.
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of armed forces during an armed conºict are not governed by the con-
vention.218 The reference to “person”219 in the conventions might be
thought to bind state ofªcials, and the conventions do not textually ex-
clude application to states. Nevertheless, given that self-enforcement is
unlikely,220 the conventions would have explicitly bound states if that was
intended.
Furthermore, application is unnecessary for two reasons. First,
state action is already restricted by, inter alia, the U.N. Charter, the Ge-
neva Conventions,221 the Genocide Convention,222 customary and con-
ventional rules against torture,223 human rights obligations, interna-
tional humanitarian law, and, in time, perhaps the emerging principle
of civilian inviolability.224 Thus, gross human rights violations, war
crimes,225 and like acts are already breaches of international law. Sec-
ond, acts done by individuals sufªciently connected to a state engage
state responsibility for breaches of the above rules.226 State involvement
in terrorism can be usefully categorized as (1) states supporting terror-
ism (provision of ideological, logistical, ªnancial, military, or opera-
tional support to a terrorist entity); (2) states operating terrorism (ini-
tiating and directing terrorism through non-state agents); and (3) states
performing terrorist acts (acts of terrorism performed by state
                                                                                                                     
218 Nuclear Terrorism Convention, supra note 51, art. 4(2).
219 E.g., Financing Convention, supra note 52, art. 2(1).
220 See Walter, supra note 33, at 37, for a similar conclusion.
221 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Fourth
Geneva Convention, supra note 150; Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539.
222 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, S. Exec. Doc. O, 81-1, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force for U.S. Feb. 23, 1989).
The text of S. Exec. Doc. O, 81-1, may be found in S. Ex. Rep. 98-51 (1984).
223 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
224 See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, An International Constitu-
tional Moment, 43 Harv. Int’l L.J. 1 (2002).
225 See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 37, art. 8.
226 International Law Commission, Articles on State Responsibility, arts. 4–11,
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/557/81/IMG/N0155781.pdf?OpenE
lement; see G.A. Res. 56/83, Annex, arts. 4-11, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 ( Jan. 28, 2002)
(citing and welcoming the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Responsibil-
ity of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts); see, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. at 14.
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agents).227 Inter-state or other transborder acts of terrorism performed
by the state that would otherwise constitute terrorism under the inter-
national deªnition, as distilled by this Article, would constitute a trans-
border use of force and are prima facie illegal. States that operate ter-
rorism through intermediaries will breach the clear obligation not to
support terrorism, directly or indirectly,228 and may also result in the
use of force itself if being attributed to the state that supported the act
of terrorism. To a large extent, the difªcult question is of evidence, not
of principle, when establishing state responsibility for engaging in ter-
rorist acts through supporting non-state actors. Thus, states do not es-
cape responsibility for terrorism. Rather, conduct that constitutes ter-
rorism by an individual breaches the states’ international obligations.
Intra-state violence is signiªcantly less regulated, although the prohibi-
tion against genocide and human rights norms constrain state behav-
ior.229
Finally, agreement on “state-perpetrated terrorism” will be hard to
achieve. Intra-state acts of violence usually attract less pressure from
other countries than those with cross-border effects, which explains the
current consensus. Whether for the pragmatic considerations of ob-
taining state consent, or on conceptual grounds, excluding state action
from the deªnition of terrorism is desirable. Presently, the Draft Com-
prehensive Terrorism Convention excludes acts by armed forces de-
spite some states’ contrary urgings (such as those of Iraq).230
9. Political Exceptions
The ªrst convention, signed in Tokyo in 1963, did not require the
application of criminal law with respect to offenses of a political nature,
thereby recognizing the political exception that motivated France to
push for a comprehensive approach to terrorism in the 1930s. A politi-
cal exception was not included in either the Montreal or The Hague
                                                                                                                     
227 See Boaz Ganor, Countering State-Sponsored Terrorism (Apr. 25, 1998), http://www.
ict.org.il/articles/counter.htm.
228 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 42; G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625 (Oct.
24, 1970).
229 See, e.g., generally David Vesel, The Lonely Pragmatist: Humanitarian Intervention in an
Imperfect World, 18 BYU J. Pub. L. 1 (2003) (discussing the possibility of humanitarian in-
tervention).
230 Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Draft Convention on International
Terrorism 3 (2002).
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Conventions of the early 1970s and is expressly excluded in the modern
conventions231 and Resolution 1566.
G. A Core Deªnition of Terrorism at International Law
The conventions exhibit high levels of ratiªcations, signaling
their widespread acceptance.232 This is illustrated in Appendix 1.233
There is striking consistency in the form, themes, and philosophy
of the various conventional statements on terrorism. Abstracting from
their particular prohibitions (or viewing the prohibitions more broadly
than in the narrow context in which they appear and considering their
underlying policy goals) illustrates that terrorism as a legal concept at
international law has a core content. The serious harming or killing of
non-combatant civilians and the damaging of property with a public
use causing economic harm done for the purpose of intimidating a
group of people or a population or to coerce a government or interna-
tional organization are proscribed outcomes. The act, which must be
independently unlawful, must be intentional, and its consequences
must at least be foreseen and desired. No particular motivation need
explain the act and none can justify it. Group action or involvement is
not a requirement, but the act must be perpetrated by a sub-state actor.
The act and/or its effects must be international in character. States
ought to ensure that the deªnition of terrorism in their domestic legal
systems is consistent with this minimum deªnition of terrorism at in-
ternational law. Although the case can be made for a broader deªni-
tion based on recent and more expansive conventions, such as the Nu-
clear Terrorism Convention, it is unrealistic to think the deªnition may
be extended by one convention, particularly one relating to a narrow
set of circumstances.  Rather, the approach of this Article is to look at
the recurrence of themes over time in determining the parameters of
the core deªnition of terrorism at international law.
Signature to and/or ratiªcation of the conventions has been par-
ticularly rapid following September 11.234 Although the conventions
received widespread approval in their own terms, abstracting from the
speciªc prohibitions to analyze the emerging trends and themes is a
                                                                                                                     
231 See, e.g., Financing Convention, supra note 52, art. 14; Bombings Convention, supra
note 52, art. 5.
232 See United Nations Treaty Collection, Conventions on Terrorism, Oct. 20, 2003,
http://untreaty.un.org./english/terrorism.asp (offering signature and ratiªcation status
information).
233 See Appendix 1.
234 See Rosard, supra note 115, at 337–38.
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valid analytical technique because states neither consider nor sign con-
ventions relating to terrorism in isolation. Although states’ anti-terror-
ism commitments are made in a speciªc context, there is little reason
to restrict this view to that particular context, especially when the view is
expressed in multiple contexts and given the trend of the conventions
towards less context-speciªc prohibitions (for example, compare the
Montreal Convention with the Bombings Convention).235
This Article does not argue that the elements of the deªnition of
terrorism as identiªed above form a customary rule. The formation of
customary international law requires the coexistence of general and
settled state practice and opinio juris.236 The evident willingness of states
to rapidly assume binding treaty obligations illustrates the momentum
and extent of state practice and the emerging opinio juris. Treaty behav-
ior can establish the dual elements of custom.237 Although the potential
for “instant custom” was recognized in the North Sea Continental Shelf
case, it requires extensive and virtually uniform state practice, including
that by particularly affected states.238 The terrorism conventions are
certainly norm-creating239 but are unlikely to satisfy this heightened
state practice requirement. Furthermore, debate persists in key areas
(such as military targets). In time, a customary prohibition may crystal-
lize, but its existence is very doubtful at present.
Given the broad support, considerable overlap in obligations,
recurring themes in the conventions, and the endorsement of the
deªnition of terrorism in Resolution 1566 by the Security Council, a
powerful deªnitional jurisprudence exists in international law
sufªcient for states to draw on in forming their own deªnition of ter-
rorism in domestic law.240 Because international and domestic
                                                                                                                     
235 See generally Bombings Conventions, supra note 52; Montreal Convention, supra note
52.
236 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. at 98-103; North Sea
Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20).
237 N. Sea Cont’l Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 3.
238 Id. at 43, ¶¶ 73–74.
239 Id. at 41, ¶ 71.
240 Note too the similarity of the core deªnition of terrorism at international law dis-
tilled by this Article and the recommended “description” of terrorism in the report of the
High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change:
[A]ny action, in addition to actions already speciªed by the existing conven-
tions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva Conventions and Security Council
resolution 1566 (2004), that is intended to cause death or serious bodily
harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such act, by its na-
ture or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or
an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.
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deªnitions exist due to the dangers posed by terrorism, the
deªnitions in the two systems should be substantively similar,241 al-
though the needs and constraints of domestic legal systems may ne-
cessitate particular drafting. Domestic deªnitions, to be consistent
with the international obligations arising under the various conven-
tions and Resolution 1373, should meet this standard.242 The interna-
tional deªnition offers a useful standard against which to measure the
domestic deªnitions.
H. Current Developments
States may receive legislative guidance on deªning terrorism from
sources other than just the conventions and resolutions. International
organizations are presently advancing model deªnitions of terrorism
(often as part of model terrorism legislation), the development of
which is inºuenced by the existing terrorism conventions. The United
Nations Ofªce on Drugs and Crime produced a guide to implement-
ing the terrorism conventions that provides model domestic legisla-
tion for states to consider and notes the desirability of consistent im-
plementation of the conventional obligations for procedural reasons.243
The Commonwealth Secretariat—an organization representing the
ªfty-three member states of the British Commonwealth—has also
produced model legislation,244 which provides a deªnition of “terrorist
act”245 based on the conventions, resolutions, and national deªni-
                                                                                                                     
U.N. High-Level Panel, supra note 85, ¶ 44.
241 Cf., Walter, supra note 33, at 31-32.
242 Cf., id. at 13.
243 U.N. Ofªce on Drugs and Crime, Legislative Guide to the Universal Anti-
Terrorism Conventions and Protocols ¶ 18 (2003).
244 See Commonwealth Secretariat, supra note 201.
245 See id. The text of the Commonwealth Secreteriat’s draft legislation states:
(1) [A]n act or omission in or outside [country name] which constitutes an
offence within the scope of a counter terrorism convention; or
(2) [A]n act or threat of action in or outside [country name] which—
(a) involves serious bodily harm to a person;
(b) involves serious damage to property;
(c) endangers a person’s life;
(d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section
of the public;
(e) involves the use of ªrearms or explosives;
(f) involves releasing into the environment or any part thereof or distrib-
uting or exposing the public or any part thereof to—
(i) any dangerous, hazardous, radioactive or harmful substance;
(ii) any toxic chemical;
(iii) any microbial or other biological agent or toxin;
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tions.246 The deªnition is not limited to the acts proscribed by the
conventions and provides an abstract deªnition principally based on
the Financing Convention. Unlike the international approach to
deªning terrorism, however, the model legislation narrows its
deªnition by expressly excluding labor strikes and protests. Notably,
the Secretariat suggests the possibility of requiring a political, ideologi-
cal, or religious motivation but does not give a recommendation ei-
ther way. This, like the express exclusion of protestors, is a suggestion
rooted in domestic rather than international law. In addition, the
C.T.C. was reported to be developing model anti-terrorism legisla-
tion,247 most likely heavily inºuenced by the United States.248
A parallel development is the possibility of a Comprehensive Ter-
rorism Convention that provides a deªnition of terrorism.249 The cur-
                                                                                                                     
(g) is designed or intended to disrupt any computer system or the provi-
sion of services directly related to communications infrastructure, banking or
ªnancial services, utilities, transportation or other essential infrastructure;
(h) is designed or intended to disrupt the provision of essential emer-
gency services such as police, civil defence or medical services;
(i) involves prejudice to national security or public safety; and is intended,
or by its nature and context, may reasonably be regarded as being intended
to:
(i) intimidate the public or a section of the public; or
(ii) compel a government or an international organization to do,
or refrain from doing, any act [and
(iii) is made for the purpose of advancing a political, ideological,
or religious cause.]
(3) [A]n act which—
(a) disrupts any services; and
(b) is committed in pursuance of a protest, demonstration or stoppage of
work, shall be deemed not to be a terrorist act within the meaning of this
deªnition, so long and so long only as the act is not intended to result in any
harm referred to in paragraphs, (a), (b), (c) or (d) of subsection (2).
Id. at 4–6. The Commonwealth Secreteriat reccommends two alternative deªnitions. The
bracketed text in clause 2(i)(iii) is the only difference between the two deªnitions.
246 Id. at 41.
247 See John D. Negroponte, U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N., Statement at
U.N. Headquarters on the Release of the U.S. Report on Counter--Terrorism, (Dec. 19,
2001), available at http://www.un.int/usa/01_195.htm.
248 Hegemonic International Law Revisited, supra note 88, at 875. American ofªcials are
also reported as saying at the C.T.C.’s inception that it would export U.S. anti-terrorism
legislation around the world. See Serge Schmemann, United Nations to Get a U.S. Antiterror
Guide, N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 2001, at B4.
249 Under G.A. Res. 51/210 (1996), supra note 91, art. 3, ¶ 9, the Ad Hoc Committee
established by that resolution, is tasked with, inter alia, drafting a comprehensive legal
framework of conventions dealing with international terrorism. See also G.A. Res. 54/110,
supra note 91, ¶ 12 (calling upon the Ad Hoc Committee to begin work on a comprehen-
sive convention.)
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rent sectoral approach of the conventions is recognized as undesir-
able.250 Although negotiations are still in progress, the current draft251
seeks to ªll in the gaps left by the sectoral conventions.252 Like the ex-
isting conventions, Article 2 lists offenses, and states are obliged to
provide for these offenses in their domestic legal systems.253 It com-
prehensively (not limited by means or target) deªnes the scope of
terrorist acts in terms very similar to the core deªnition distilled from
the existing terrorism conventions,254 although the draft is subject to
criticism.255 Notably, the draft deªnes “terrorist act” and does not pro-
vide a conceptual deªnition of “terrorism.”256
III. Domestic Law Deªnitions of Terrorism
A. Introduction
As outlined above, international law seeks to work through domes-
tic law to eliminate terrorism. Unlike international law where the lack
of a comprehensive and clear deªnition is not fatal, a domestic anti-
terrorism statute must provide a precise deªnition of terrorism. Al-
though not all jurisdictions have a void for vagueness doctrine, all the
jurisdictions in this study require that criminal laws be sufªciently
knowable.257 For example, the United States Constitution precludes
punishment pursuant to a vague criminal provision.258 Such restrictions
protect against the arbitrary application of the laws. This protection is
                                                                                                                     
250 See, e.g., Bassiouni, Multilateral Conventions, supra note 6, at 6.
251 See Draft Comprehensive Terrorism Convention, supra note 139, Annex I.
252 See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee Established by General Assembly Resolution 51/210 of 17
December, 1996, 7th Session, U.N. Doc. A/58/37 (Mar. 31-Apr. 2, 2003).
253 Draft Comprehensive Terrorism Convention, supra note 139, cls. 4, 5.
254 For the text of the deªnition, see Draft Comprehensive Terrorism Convention, supra
note 139.
255 See Alexandra V. Orlova & James W. Moore, “Umbrellas” or “Building Blocks”?:
Deªning International Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime in International Law, 27
Hous. J. Int’l L. 267, 273–76 (2005).
256 Id. at 272.
257 See Kokkinakis v. Greece, 17 Eur. Ct. H.R. 397, 423 (1994); Andrew Ashworth,
Principles of Criminal Law 67 (2d ed. 1995); A.P. Simester & W. J. Brookbanks, Prin-
ciples of Criminal Law ¶ 2.1.3 (2d ed. 2002); see also Raz, The Authority of Law: Es-
says on Law and Morality 214–15 (1979).
258 See U.S. Const. amends. V, VI, XIV; (providing, respectively, the modern basis for
the federal void for vagueness doctrine, the early foundation of the void for vagueness
doctrine, and applying the doctrine to the states). In fact, early common law practice was
for courts to refuse to enforce legislation deemed too uncertain to be applied. Ralph W.
Aigler, Legislation in Vague or General Terms, 21 Mich. L. Rev. 831, 836 (1923).
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particularly important with respect to politically motivated crimes.259
The requirement that the laws be sufªciently knowable also ensures
satisfaction of the fair notice requirement implicit in the rule of law.
A domestic law deªnition of terrorism has four major functions.
First, most domestic regimes provide for a designation process whereby
persons or entities are certiªed as a “terrorist” or a “terrorist organiza-
tion.” Such a designation often permits asset seizure or freezing, height-
ened monitoring, questioning, and detention. The deªnition deter-
mines who may be designated. Second, the deªnition forms an ele-
ment of many terrorism-related offenses.260 Third, it allocates responsi-
bility within government. In the United States, for example, a crime of
terrorism is primarily investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tions (F.B.I.) and the Department of Justice rather than local police261
and may permit intelligence agencies to become involved. Fourth, the
deªnition of terrorism is crucial for delimiting responses to the prob-
lem.262 Particularly because of the ªrst and second functions, the
deªnition must be precise in order to provide adequate notice of what
constitutes unlawful conduct.263 Given the invasive police investigative
and detention powers conferred speciªcally for countering terror-
ism,264 clear parameters of terrorism as a concept protect the public as
well as facilitate the apprehension and punishment of terrorists. Clear
parameters also serve to distinguish organized and other crime from
terrorism.
                                                                                                                     
259 See generally Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966). But see Interstate Circuit,
Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968); Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law ¶ 2.3(c) (4th
ed. 2003) (suggesting that language that is so vague that it makes detection of arbitrary
enforcement very difªcult is problematic).
260 See, e.g., Terrorism Act 2000, 2000, c. 11, § 15 (U.K.) (criminalizing the funding of
terrorism), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/20000011.htm (last visited
Oct. 19, 2005).
261 Philip B. Heymann, Terrorism and America: A Common Sense Strategy for a
Democratic Society 4–5 (1998).
262 W. Michael Reisman, International Legal Responses to Terrorism, 22 Hous. J. Int’l L. 3,
9 (1999).
263 See generally Crandon v. United Sates, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990); McBoyle v. United
States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931).
264 See, e.g., The Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002, No. 15, §§ 52(4), 62, Acts of Par-
liament, 2002, (India), available at http://mha.nic.in/poto-02.htm#pnm(preventing an
accused’s lawyer from being present throughout interrogation and providing for adminis-
trative detentions in various jurisdictions); Bassiouni, Multilateral Conventions, supra
note 6, at 20 (stating that “[n]early every proposed or enacted piece of legislation in the
world that purports to prevent and control individual terrorism exists in the nature of
repressive penal and administrative measures”).
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Most states adopted or amended their anti-terrorism laws follow-
ing September 11 or are currently doing so. The purpose of this Part
is to assess the extent to which international obligations and the in-
ternational jurisprudence on the deªnition question are inºuential in
domestic law by (1) considering the drafting history of domestic
deªnitions of terrorism with respect to the role played by interna-
tional law and (2) comparing the domestic deªnitions with the core
international deªnition to assess the degree of substantive similarity.
The former task is made more difªcult by legislative drafters’ reports,
which tend not to be particularly detailed. To make the inquiry man-
ageable, this Article considers the position of four common law juris-
dictions that actively participate in international law but in which in-
ternational law does not have automatic authority.265 The United
States, United Kingdom, New Zealand, and India, all liberal democra-
cies, are currently threatened by terrorism and have experienced ter-
rorism over the last 100 years to quite different extents. This Part of
the Article argues that, given the high degree of similarity between
the domestic and international deªnitions, one can infer that interna-
tional law, through its obligations and deªnitional jurisprudence, has
been inºuential.
Although the four jurisdictions examined in this Article exhibit a
relatively strong commitment to the rule of law, doubts are frequently
expressed (to varying degrees) about the propriety of each state’s
anti-terrorism legislation. Some criticism is leveled directly at the
deªnition of terrorism.266 For example, Amnesty International has
expressed concerns that the vagueness of the Indian deªnition might
permit the government to silence legitimate political dissent.267 Many
of the recently created police powers and criminal offenses are trig-
gered by, or require a determination of, terrorist activity. Thus, the
deªnition acts as a gatekeeper to invasive police powers and criminal
liability. A broad and open deªnition has the effect of conferring
greater powers on the police than a narrow deªnition does.
                                                                                                                     
265 Each of the United States, United Kingdom, New Zealand, and India follow the
common law approach to the relationship between domestic and international law
whereby each legal system is viewed as a separate sphere (a “dualist” conception). The
Netherlands and Greece, for example, use a different approach. See Antonio Cassese,
International Law 179 (2002).
266 See, e.g., Nanda, supra note 10, at 604.
267 See SA Law Commission Project 105 Review of Security Legislation (Aug. 2002) 316.
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B. The Relationship of International Law and Domestic Law
Modern international law has a signiªcant impact on states’ do-
mestic legal systems, often requiring states to enact domestic legislation
in order to achieve objectives mandated by international law. Treaties—
binding international agreements between states governed by interna-
tional law268 and a source of public international law269—increasingly
shape the international regulatory system. Signiªcantly, the anti-terror-
ism conventions require signatory states to implement domestic legisla-
tion criminalizing certain acts that the international community has
declared to be acts of terrorism.
Broadly speaking, in both monist and dualist legal systems,270 trea-
ties require some form of national approval before becoming part of
domestic law. Professor Antonio Cassese believes that “international law
cannot work without the constant help, co-operation, and support of
national legal systems.”271 The inºuence that international law has on
domestic law depends almost completely on domestic law rules and
political will. International law is relatively silent on this matter.272 It
simply asks for the good faith implementation of its treaties.273
In those states closely following the British common law tradition
(including the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and India), interna-
tional obligations accepted by the executive by exercise of its preroga-
tive must be transformed into domestic law by the legislature before
such international obligations affect private rights or liabilities, mod-
                                                                                                                     
268 Klabbers, supra note 126, at 37–38; see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties, art. II (1)(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (providing a deªnition of the term
“treaty”) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. This deªnition has been largely accepted as
declarative of custom. See, e.g., Qatar v. Bahrain, 1994 I.C.J. 112, 137 (Oda, J., dissenting).
269 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, 3 Bevans 1179; 59 Stat. 1031;
T.S. No. 993. (1945).
270 See Brownlie, supra note 95, at 32–34 (providing a discussion of dualist and monist
theories of international law).
271 Antonio Cassese, International Law in a Divided World 15 (1986) [hereinaf-
ter Cassese, Divided World].
272 See Francis G. Jacobs, Introduction, in The Effect of Treaties in Domestic Law, at
xxiii, xxiv (Francis G. Jacobs & Shelley Roberts eds., 1987).
273 Vienna Convention, supra note 268, art. 26 (“Every treaty in force is binding upon
the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith”); see Cassese, Divided
World, supra note 271, at 169 (noting the “wish of sovereign States to regulate interna-
tional relations as they thought best, without any obligation being imposed from outside”);
see also Stefan Kadelbach, International Law and the Incorporation of Treaties into Domestic Law,
42 Ger. Y.B. Int’l L. 66, 67 (1999) (noting that deep—or often any—analysis of imple-
mentation is also absent from most textbooks on international law).
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ify the existing law, or require public funds.274 Broadly speaking, this
common law division of powers still persists despite minor deviations275
and codiªcations.276 In the United States, the treaty-making power is
vested in the President acting with the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate.277 Once a treaty is adopted by the Senate, it becomes part of the
“supreme Law of the Land.”278 The terrorism conventions cannot be
regarded as self-executing279 because they create crimes and confer
jurisdiction. Thus, in each of the four states, implementing legislation
is required to give effect to the treaty obligations.
Some courts and commentators, most notably Professor Ian
Brownlie, posit a general duty to bring national law into conformity
with international law,280 arising from the “nature of treaty obligations
and from customary law.”281 A survey of contemporary state practice
powerfully questions the existence of such a norm.282 Irrespective of
this duty, failure to enact the appropriate implementing legislation
would put the state in breach of its international treaty obligations as
well as those obligations under Security Council Resolution 1373. The
conventions’ beneªts are maximized by consistent and widespread im-
plementation of their prohibitions and provisions, inter alia, because
terrorists can select a home base jurisdiction but strike other states util-
izing modern transborder transportation and communication systems.
C. Domestic Law Deªnitions
This section very brieºy considers the deªnitions of terrorism in
the four domestic jurisdictions with a particular view as to the inºuence
international law has had on the deªnitions’ development. As illus-
                                                                                                                     
274 Brownlie, supra note 95, at 47–48; Attorney Gen. for Canada v. Attorney Gen. for
Ontario, [1937] A.C. 326, 347.
275 See, e.g., generally Mai Chen, A Constitutional Revolution? The Role of the New Zealand
Parliament in Treaty-Making, 19 N.Z.U.L. Rev. 448 (2001) (noting the increased role of Par-
liament in approving treaties in New Zealand).
276 See, e.g., India Const. art. 253: amended by the Constitution (Eighty-sixth Amend-
ment) Act, 2002 (providing the legislature’s power to implement treaty obligations).
277 U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
278 Id. art. VI.
279 See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829); United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791
(S.D. Fla. 1992); Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States § 111(1) (1986).
280 Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, Advisory Opinion, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser.
B) No. 10, at 20 (Feb. 21); Brownlie, supra note 95, at 35; Peter Malanczuk, Ake-
hurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law 64 (7th ed. 1997).
281 Brownlie, supra note 95, at 36.
282 Cf. Cassese, Divided World, supra note 271, at 167-99.
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trated below, international law inºuenced some states but appears not
to have played even an indirect role in others. Examining the domestic
deªnitions is an important precondition to assessing their substantive
similarity with the international deªnition, which follows this section.
1. United Kingdom
Between 1969 and the 1998 “Good Friday” peace accord in
Northern Ireland, 3289 people were killed by terrorism in Northern
Ireland.283 Between 1976 and 1998, there were ninety-four incidents of
international terrorism in the United Kingdom (including over Lock-
erbie).284
The United Kingdom was one of the ªrst states to speciªcally
criminalize terrorism.285 Parliament responded to bombings by the
Irish Republican Army with the Prevention of Violence (Temporary
Provisions) Act 1939.286 Although temporary in title, it was extended
annually until 1954. Frequent bombings in mid-1974 prompted passage
of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974, which
followed the 1939 model.287 This Act, of six months temporary dura-
tion, was temporary in name only; it remained on the books (as
amended) until 2000. It very broadly deªned terrorism as “the use of
violence for political ends, and includes any use of violence for the
purpose of putting the public, or any section of the public in fear.”288
Following an ofªcial inquiry,289 the Terrorism Act 2000 was passed
as a permanent statute.290 In response to September 11, the Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 was hurriedly passed,291 con-
                                                                                                                     
283 Secretary of State for the Home Department & the Secretary of State for
Northern Ireland, Legislation Against Terrorism, A Consultation Paper, 1998,
Cm. 4178, at ch. 2.3 [hereinafter Legislation Against Terrorism, A Consultation
Paper], available at http://www.archive.ofªcial-documents.co.uk/document/cm41/4178/
4178.htm. See generally Lord Lloyd of Berwick, Inquiry into Legislation Against
Terrorism, 1996, Cm. 3420, vol. 1, ch. 1, vol. 2. app. F.
284 Legislation Against Terrorism, A Consultation Paper, supra note 283.
285 See generally Clive Walker, The Prevention of Terrorism in British Law (2nd.
ed. 1992) (discussing the history of terrorism).
286 Id. at 31.
287 Id. at 31, 40.
288 This deªnition is also used in the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions)
Act, 1989, c. 4, § 20(1) (U.K.).
289 Lloyd, supra note 283.
290 David Williams, The United Kingdom’s Response to International Terrorism, 13 Ind. Int’l
& Comp. L. Rev. 683, 689–90 nn.37–41 (2003) (citing the numerous times the Terrorism
Act has been used).
291 It has been subject to criticism including being labeled “the most draconian legisla-
tion Parliament . . . passed in peacetime in over a century.” Adam Tomkins, Legislating
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ferring new powers and creating new offenses. The Terrorism Act 2000
introduced a general deªnition of terrorism not limited by geogra-
phy.292 “Terrorism” is an act or threat thereof that is designed to
inºuence the United Kingdom (or a foreign government) or to intimi-
date a population that is done for the purpose of advancing a political,
religious, or ideological cause that brings about a prohibited outcome.
The listed prohibited outcomes are: endangering another person’s life
or creating a serious risk to the public’s health or safety; acts designed
to interfere seriously with or to disrupt an electronic system; and acts
                                                                                                                     
Against Terror: the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 Pub. L. 205, 205 (2002); see also
Helen Fenwick, The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001: A Proportionate Response to 11
September?, 65 Mod. L. Rev. 724, 724 (2002).
292 Terrorism Act 2000, c. 11, § 1 (U.K.). See the deªnition in the Reinsurance (Acts of
Terrorism) Act, 1993, c. 18, § 2(2) (U.K.) (“In this section ‘acts of terrorism’ means acts of
persons acting on behalf of, or in connection with, any organisation which carries out
activities directed towards the overthrowing or inºuencing, by force or violence, of Her
Majesty’s government in the United Kingdom or any other government de jure or de
facto”). This deªnition, based on the Association of British Reinsurers’ wording may be
more concerned with business than terrorism. Clive Walker, Blackstone’s Guide to
the Anti-terrorism Legislation (2002) [hereinafter Blackstone’s Guide]. In the Ter-
rorism Act 2000, c. 11, § 1 (U.K.), the deªnition of terrorism is:
(1) In this Act “terrorism” means the use or threat of action where-
(a) the action falls within subsection (2),
(b) the use or threat is designed to inºuence the government or to intimi-
date the public or a section of the public, and
(c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, re-
ligious or ideological cause.
(2) Action falls within this subsection if it-
(a) involves serious violence against a person,
(b) involves serious damage to property,
(c) endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person committing
the action,
(d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section
of the public, or
(e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an elec-
tronic system.
(3) The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which involves
the use of ªrearms or explosives is terrorism whether or not subsection
(1)(b) is satisªed.
(4) In this section—
(a) “action” includes action outside the United Kingdom,
(b) a reference to any person or to property is a reference to any person,
or to property, wherever situated,
(c) a reference to the public includes a reference to the public of a coun-
try other than the United Kingdom, and
(d) “the government” means the government of the United Kingdom, of a
part of the United Kingdom or of a country other than the United Kingdom.
Id.
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involving serious violence to or death of another person or serious
property damage.
The new deªnition is signiªcantly broader in scope but is more
tightly framed than the deªnition in the 1974 and 1989 Acts. The pre-
paratory work evidences little direct inºuence of international law.
Rather, the deªnition’s roots are in the Lloyd Report’s recommended
adoption of the F.B.I. working deªnition.293  A later report, however,
doubted that the F.B.I. deªnition was sufªciently comprehensive and
voiced concern regarding property otherwise not protected (for exam-
ple, harm to computer systems and data).294 How the deªnition’s sub-
stance compares to international law is examined in Section D below.
2. United States
The creatively titled Uniting and Strengthening America by Pro-
viding Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terror-
ism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001 is the most recent U.S. legislative
measure dealing with terrorism.295 Its forerunners include the Act to
Combat International Terrorism of 1984 (which established a system of
rewards for information regarding terrorism);296 the Diplomatic Secu-
rity and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 (which facilitated sanctions against
states that sponsored terrorism and criminalized murder or the causing
of serious harm to Americans abroad if the Attorney General judged
that the act was “intended to coerce, intimidate or retaliate against a
government or civilian population”);297 the Antiterrorism Act of 1990
(deªning terrorism and providing for civil remedies);298 and the Vio-
                                                                                                                     
293 According to Legislation Against Terrorism, A Consultation Paper, Lord Loyd
recommended the UK government adopt the F.B.I.’s working deªnition of terrorism, which
is stated to be: “[T]he use of serious violence against persons or property, or the threat to use
such violence, to intimidate or coerce a government, the public, or any section of the public
in order to promote political, social, or ideological objectives.” Lloyd, supra note 283, at
¶ 3.14–.15.
294 Id. at 11.
295 For a full discussion of the legislation enacted immediately following September 11,
see Joshua D. Zelman, Recent Developments in International Law: Anti-Terrorism Legislation—
Part One: An Overview, 11 J. Transnat’l L. & Pol’y 183, 183–93 (2001). For an overview of
U.S. antiterrorism and a brief summary of the major acts, see Norman Abrams, Anti-
Terrorism and Criminal Enforcement 5–20 (2003).
296 Pub. L. No. 98–533, 98 Stat. 2706 (codiªed as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3071
(1984)).
297 Pub. L. No. 99–399, § 1202(e), 100 Stat. 853 (codiªed as amended at 18 U.S.C.A.
2331 (1986)).
298 Pub. L. No. 101–519, § 132, 104 Stat. 2240 (codiªed as amended at 18 U.S.C.A.
2331–38 (1990)).
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lent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (which criminal-
ized providing material support to terrorists).299 Following the Okla-
homa City bombing in 1995, Congress passed the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 that provided, inter alia, for the des-
ignation of foreign organizations, the consequential freezing of assets,
and the extraterritorial extension of jurisdiction over terrorist acts.300
Also noteworthy is an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immu-
nities Act. It carves out an exception to the broad grant of immunity
for foreign states in federal and state courts by permitting certain suits
for money damages against foreign states that sponsor terrorism.301
Following September 11, there was a widely perceived need to en-
act legislation that would protect the United States from international
terrorism.302 The response—the Patriot Act—was passed at record-
breaking speed303 and signed by President George W. Bush on October
26, 2001. It is comprehensive (342 pages covering 350 subject areas),304
and it expands the powers of the federal government to combat terror-
ism in the areas of surveillance and interception of communications. It
provides for greater information sharing, greater inter-agency coordi-
nation, and closer policing of ªnancial transactions. It also strengthens
the anti-money-laundering regulations with a view to disrupting terror-
ists’ resource ºows, tightens immigration laws and enhances their en-
forcement, creates new crimes connected to terrorist acts, and expands
existing crimes. The Patriot Act also authorizes administrative deten-
tions.305
United States federal law contains nineteen deªnitions or de-
scriptions of terrorism.306 Although many of the deªnitions are simi-
                                                                                                                     
299 Pub. L. No. 103–322, § 120005, 108 Stat. 1796 (codiªed as amended at 18 U.S.C.A.
2339A (1994)).
300 Pub. L. No. 104–132, §§ 301–03, 321–30, 110 Stat. 1214, (codiªed as amended in
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.A. 2339B (1996)).
301 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a) (2002); see, e.g., Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 184 F.
Supp. 2d 13 (D.D.C. 2002).
302 Zelman, supra note 295, at 183. See generally Charles Doyle, The USA PATRIOT Act: A
Legal Analysis, in The USA PATRIOT Act (Aphonse Ewing ed., 2002).
303 Phillip A. Thomas, Emergency and Anti-Terrorist Powers 9/11: USA and UK, 26 Ford-
ham Int’l L. Rev. 1193, 1210 (2003).
304 Id. at 1209.
305 Pub. L. No. 107–56, § 412, 115 Stat. 272 (codiªed as amended at 8 U.S.C.A.
§ 1226(a) (2001)).
306 Nicholas J. Perry, The Numerous Federal Legal Deªnitions of Terrorism: The Problem of Too
Many Grails, 30 J. Legis. 249, 255 (2004).
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lar, they vary considerably with respect to material matters.307 This fact
demonstrates that different circumstances and departmental func-
tions are best served by tailored deªnitions.308 Courts have said that
the United States “characterizes rather than enumerates acts [of ter-
rorism] for the purposes of designating foreign state sponsors of ter-
rorism and deªning criminal terrorist offenses under federal law” be-
cause of the uncertainty with respect to what constitutes terrorism.309
The United States may suffer from a lack of consistent conceptual
clarity310 due to many and differing deªnitions of terrorism.311 A Con-
gressional subcommittee found that “practically every agency of the
United States Government . . . with a counterterrorism mission uses a
different deªnition of terrorism [and that all such agencies] should
agree on a single deªnition, so that it would be clear what activity
constitutes terrorism and who should be designated as a terrorist.”312
In addition, each U.S. state has its own criminal law deªnition of ter-
                                                                                                                     
307 Although a full review of all the federal deªnitions of terrorism is beyond the scope
of this Article, a helpful collection of the federal deªnitions together with analysis may be
found in Perry, supra note 306, at 254–69.
308 Different agencies and other parts of government have different deªnitions suiting
their own needs. For example, the deªnition used by the Department of State to prepare
its annual report on terrorism states that terrorism means “premeditated, politically moti-
vated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clan-
destine agents” 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2004). The current F.B.I. deªnition of terrorism
is “the unlawful use of force and violation against persons or property to intimidate or
coerce government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of
political or social objectives.” 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(l) (2004); see Federal Bureau of Investi-
gations, Terrorism in the Untied States, at ii (1999). Noteworthy too is the deªnition
of terrorism in Executive Order 13224 issued by President George W. Bush on Sept. 23,
2001 which deªnes terrorism as “an activity that (i) involves a violent act or an act danger-
ous to human life, property, or infrastructure; and (ii) appears to be intended (A) to in-
timidate or coerce a civilian population ; (B) to inºuence the policy of a government by
intimidation or coercion; or (C) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruc-
tion, assassination, kidnapping, or hostage-taking.” Blocking Property and Prohibiting
Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten To Commit, or Support Terrorism 66
Fed. Reg. 49,079, 49,080 (Sept. 23, 2001).
309 Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 17.
310 Yonah Alexander, Terrorism: A Deªnitional Focus, in Terrorism and the Law 3 (Yo-
nah Alexander & Edgar H Brenner eds., 2001).
311 See Levitt, supra introductory quote, at 103–08 (considering the U.S. attempts to
deªne terrorism in legislation in the 1970s and early 1980s).
312 See Staff of H. Subcomm. on Terrorism and Homeland Security, House Per-
manent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 107th Cong., Report on Counterterrorism
Capabilities and Performance Prior to 9–11, ( July 2002), available at http://www.fas.
org/irp/congress/2002_rpt/hpsci_ths0702.html (recommending that the “standard
deªnition” of terrorism is, “the illegitimate, premeditated use of politically motivated vio-
lence or the threat of violence by a sub-national group against persons or property with the
intent to coerce a government by instilling fear amongst the populace”).
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rorism.313 Signiªcantly for the purposes of this study, the U.S. imple-
mentation of the Financing Convention contains a carbon copy of the
Convention’s deªnition, which is used only for the purposes of the
implementing act.314
Chapter 113B of Title 18 deals with terrorism. Sections 802 and
808 of the Patriot Act amended two of the existing criminal law
deªnitions of terrorism. One of the most signiªcant deªnitions, 18
U.S.C.A. § 2331(1) (inserted in 1992)315 presently deªnes international
terrorism as activities involving violent acts (or those acts dangerous to
human life) that constitute crimes in the United States (or would do so
if committed within U.S. jurisdiction) that appear to be intended “(i) to
intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to inºuence the policy of
a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct
of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping” and
that occur primarily outside U.S. territorial jurisdiction or transcend
boundaries in some way.316 This deªnition, however, does not form part
                                                                                                                     
313 E.g., Ala. Code § 13A-10–151(1) (1975).
314 See Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102–572, tit. X,
§ 1003(a)(3) 106 Stat. 4506 (1992) (codiªed at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2331, amended by Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Ob-
struct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 802(a)(1), 115 Stat.
272 (2001)); see also Antiterrorism Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–519, § 132(b)(3), 104 Stat.
2240 (1990) (repealed by Act of Apr. 10, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102- 27, tit. IV, § 402, 105 Stat.
130 (1991)). Under § 2331, the deªnition of terrorism is:
(1) [T]he term “international terrorism” means  activities that—
(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation
of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a
criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or
of any State;
(B) appear to be intended—
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to inºuence the policy of a government by intimidation or co-
ercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, as-
sassination, or kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States,
or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are ac-
complished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the
locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.
Id.
315 See Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992 § 1003.
316 It is noteworthy that the deªnition of terrorism in the Homeland Security Act of
2002 is substantially similar to the § 2331 deªnition. Pub. L. No. 107–296, § 2(15), 116 Stat
2135, 2141 (codiªed as amended at 6 U.S.C.A § 101 (2002)); Perry, supra note 306, at 256–
57. Another deªnition—relating to using and possessing anti-terrorism technology—is
provided in the Homeland Security Act, supra, § 865(2)(B).
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of a criminal offense. Rather, it functions in a variety of contexts includ-
ing allowing the disclosure of tax information during investigations,317
granting warrants for investigations relating to terrorism,318 and allow-
ing ªnancial information disclosure rules.319 Second, 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 2332b, inserted by the Anti-terrorism Act of 1996, concerns acts of
terrorism that transcend national boundaries.320 It deªnes the “federal
crime of terrorism” in (g)(5) as a breach of a listed provision of U.S.
criminal law that is “calculated to inºuence or affect the conduct of
government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against gov-
ernment conduct.”321 The long list of offenses includes a range of
                                                                                                                     
317 26 U.S.C.A. § 6103(b)(11) (2002).
318 Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(b)(3).
319 31 C.F.R. § 103.90(b) (2002).
320 See Pub. L. No. 104–132, tit. VII, § 702(a), 110 Stat. 1291 (1996) (codiªed as
amended at 18 U.S.C.A § 2332b (2001)). This deªnition is closely modeled on the
deªnition that appeared in the Foreign Intelligence Immunity Act which was enacted in
1978. 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2000).
321 The term “Federal crime of terrorism” in 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332b(g)(5) mean an of-
fense that:
(A) is calculated to inºuence or affect the conduct of government by intimi-
dation or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct; and
(B) is a violation of—
(i) section 32 (relating to destruction of aircraft or aircraft facilities), 37
(relating to violence at international airports), 81 (relating to arson within
special maritime and territorial jurisdiction), 175 or 175b (relating to bio-
logical weapons), 229 (relating to chemical weapons), subsection (a), (b),
(c), or (d) of section 351 (relating to congressional, cabinet, and Supreme
Court assassination and kidnapping), 831 (relating to nuclear materials),
842(m) or (n) (relating to plastic explosives), 844(f)(2) or (3) (relating to arson and
bombing of Government property risking or causing death), 844(i) (relating to
arson and bombing of property used in interstate commerce), 930(c) (relat-
ing to killing or attempted killing during an attack on a Federal facility with a
dangerous weapon), 956(a)(1) (relating to conspiracy to murder, kidnap, or
maim persons abroad), 1030(a)(1) (relating to protection of computers),
1030(a)(5)(A)(i) resulting in damage as deªned in 1030(a)(5)(B)(ii) through (v) (re-
lating to protection of computers), 1114 (relating to killing or attempted killing
of ofªcers and employees of the United States), 1116 (relating to murder or
manslaughter of foreign ofªcials, ofªcial guests, or internationally protected
persons), 1203 (relating to hostage taking), 1362 (relating to destruction of
communication lines, stations, or systems), 1363 (relating to injury to build-
ings or property within special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States), 1366(a) (relating to destruction of an energy facility),
1751(a), (b), (c), or (d) (relating to Presidential and Presidential staff assas-
sination and kidnapping), 1992 (relating to wrecking trains), 1993 (relating
to terrorist attacks and other acts of violence against mass transportation sys-
tems), 2155 (relating to destruction of national defense materials, premises, or
utilities), 2280 (relating to violence against maritime navigation), 2281 (relating to
violence against maritime ªxed platforms), 2332 (relating to certain homicides
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crimes against persons and property and does not necessarily involve
transnational acts.
Historically, the United States has not taken a completely isola-
tionalist approach to the deªnition question. Legislation enacted in
1985 that prohibited foreign assistance to countries shielding persons
guilty of international terrorism322 chose not to deªne the term and
preferred that its deªnition be the product of international negotia-
tions in which the President was called upon to engage.323 There is no
evidence, however, that international law was an important considera-
tion when drafting the criminal law deªnitions considered above.
3. India
On October 16, 2001, the President of India promulgated The
Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance 2001 (Terrorism Ordinance) which
remained in effect for six weeks.324 Despite India’s history of terrorism,
there was signiªcant opposition in Parliament to the legislation in bill
form partly because it replicated the Terrorism Ordinance’s provisions.
Between 1988 and 1999, Indian authorities estimate that 20,506 people
                                                                                                                     
and other violence against United States nationals occurring outside of the
United States), 2332a (relating to use of weapons of mass destruction), 2332b
(relating to acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries), 2332f (relating
to bombing of public places and facilities), 2339 (relating to harboring terrorists),
2339A (relating to providing material support to terrorists), 2339B (relating to
providing material support to terrorist organizations), 2339C (relating to
ªnancing of terrorism[)], or 2340A (relating to torture) of this title;
(ii) section 236 (relating to sabotage of nuclear facilities or fuel) of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2284); or
(iii) section 46502 (relating to aircraft piracy), the second sentence of sec-
tion 46504 (relating to assault on a ºight crew with a dangerous weapon), sec-
tion 46505(b)(3) or (c) (relating to explosive or incendiary devices, or en-
dangerment of human life by means of weapons, on aircraft), section 46506 if
homicide or attempted homicide is involved (relating to application of cer-
tain criminal laws to acts on aircraft), or section 60123(b) (relating to de-
struction of interstate gas or hazardous liquid pipeline facility) of title 49.
Id.
322 International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99–
83, § 503, 99 Stat. 190 (1985) (codiªed as amended at 22 U.S.C.A. § 2371 (2004)).
323 Id. § 507 (noting that the treaty was to be concluded between “those democratic na-
tions . . . most victimized by terrorism” and “should incorporate an operative deªnition of
terrorism”).
324 Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, 2001, No. 9, Acts of Parliament, 2001, available
at http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/Terrorism/poto_2001.htm; see India Const. art.
3, § 123, cls. 1, 2. Ordinances have the same force of law as statutes but are of limited dura-
tion and automatically expire unless approved by the legislature.
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were killed in Jammu and Kashmir provinces alone,325 mostly in attacks
of an international character. Although the Indian Parliament itself was
attacked by terrorists on December 13, 2001,326 the legislation was not
passed until March 28, 2002.327 Opposition parties complained that the
government was using September 11 to push through legislation reen-
acting the draconian Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention)
Act 1985 (TADA), which had lapsed in 1995.328 The government re-
sponded by claiming that the measures were required by Resolution
1373,329 although amendments were made that softened the bill.330 In-
ternational comparisons were drawn to justify the need for the legisla-
tion.331 The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2002 criminalizes various
acts,332 including terrorist acts and fundraising for the purposes of ter-
rorism. Membership in terrorist organizations is also prohibited as is
providing support and funds to such organizations.333
Much of the criticism of the legislation comes from India’s experi-
ences with TADA. Of the 75,000 arrests made under the Act, only 1–2%
resulted in convictions,334 leading to widespread criticism of the Act.335
                                                                                                                     
325 See Law Commission of India, 173rd Report on Prevention of Terrorism Bill,
2000, § II 1.3 (2000), available at http://www.lawcommissionoªndia.nic.in/tada.htm [here-
inafter Law Commission report].
326 Amy Waldman, India-Pakistan Talks Make No Speciªc Gains on Kashmir, N.Y. Times,
June 29, 2004 at A8.
327 Prevention of Terrorism Act 2002, (India).
328 See Krisna Prasad, Everything You Wanted to Know About POTO, Nov. 11, 2001, http://
www.rediff.com/news/2001/nov/19spec.htm; interview by Kota Neelima with Justice Ran-
ganath Misra, former Chief Justice of India and Chairperson of the National Human
Rights Commission, POTO Is an Easy Way out for Govt, There Should Be No Shortcuts for Human
Rights, The Indian Express, Nov. 2, 2001, available at http://www.indian-express.com/
ie20011102/op4.html. Justice Misra said the Ordinance was an easy way out for law-
enforcement. Another repressive act was the Rowlatt Act of 1919, which was a British stat-
ute enacted to entrench colonial rule and suppress dissidents in India. C. Raj Kumar, Hu-
man Rights Implications of National Security Laws in India: Combatting Terrorism While Preserving
Civil Liberties, 33 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 195, 199 (2005).
329 See Prasad, supra note 328.
330 E.g., clause 3(8) of the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance 2001, supra note 324,
which compels disclosure of information known to be of material assistance in preventing
terrorist offences unless reasonable to do otherwise, was excluded.
331 See Law Commission Report, supra note 325, § VI(b) (putting forward the case for
permanent anti-terrorism legislation by arguing that if the United Kingdom needs it, India
deªnitely does).
332 Prevention of Terrorism Act 2002, § 3 (India).
333Id. §§ 21, 22.
334 See Prasad, supra note 328.
335See Amnesty Int’l, Submission to the Human Rights Committee Concerning the Application
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, AI Index ASA 20/027/1997, July 1,
1997, http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA200271997?open&of=ENG-IND.
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The following frequent objection has been leveled against counter-
terrorism legislation more generally:336
[E]very criminal act deªned in [the 2002 Act] is already
contained in the Indian Penal Code. . . . What [the Act] does
is to merely criminalise the intent i.e. intention to cause ter-
ror, threaten the unity, integrity and sovereignty of the coun-
try, supporting terrorists, being a member of a terrorist or-
ganisation, etc [sic].
The Law Commission of India (Law Commission), which was re-
sponsible for drafting the legislation, considered the U.S. Antiterrorism
Act 1996 and the U.K. Prevention of Terrorism Act 1989 in its prepara-
tory work337 and noted that Security Council Resolution 1269 called
upon all states to implement their international obligations under the
international terrorism conventions. Thus, both comparative law analy-
sis and India’s international obligations were relevant to the Law
Commission’s thinking. Although intended to introduce a new
deªnition of terrorism less open to government abuse than that in
TADA,338 the Law Commission’s proposed deªnition was similar to that
in TADA.339 It exhibits the inºuence of the U.S. and U.K. deªnitions,
not of international law.340
The deªnition of terrorist in the Prevention of Terrorism Act is to
be inferred341 from the deªnition of “terrorist act” in section 3(1),342
                                                                                                                     
336 Vijay Nagaraj, India: The Politics of Anti-Terrorism Legislation, Commonwealth Human
Rights Initiative Seminar 4 ( June 5–6, 2003).
337 Law Commission of India, Working Paper on Legislation to Combat Terrorism in Law
Commission Report, supra note 325, Annex. I.
338 Asia Paciªc Human Rights Network, Submission to the Advisory Council of Jurists, Jan.
2004, http://www.asiapaciªcforum.net/jurists/terrorism/aphrn_india.pdf.
339 Law Commission Report, supra note 325, § II, 1.16.1 (noting that the proposed
bill is basically modeled on the TADA (Prevention) Act 1987”).
340 See generally id. at Part 2.
341 The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2002, § 2(1)(g) (India).
342 Id. § 3(1) (India), deªned terrorism as:
[W]ith intent to threaten the unity, integrity, security or sovereignty of India
or to strike terror in the people or any section of the people does any act or
thing by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive substances or inºammable
substances or ªrearms or other lethal weapons or poisons or noxious gases or
other chemicals or by any other substances (whether biological or otherwise)
of a hazardous nature or by any other means whatsoever, in such a manner as
to cause, or likely to cause, death of, or injuries to any person or persons or
loss of, or damage to, or destruction of, property or disruption of any supplies
or services essential to the life of the community or causes damage or de-
struction of any property or equipment used or intended to be used for the
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which is ambiguous, poorly drafted, and confusing. Section 3(1) states
that a terrorist act is committed by someone who intends to “threaten
the unity, integrity, security or sovereignty of India” or terrorize the
population by use of explosives, ªrearms, or other lethal weapons; poi-
sons, toxins, or other chemicals; or by “any other means whatsoever” to
kill or injure persons, damage or destroy property, disrupt essential
supplies or services, damage or destroy national defense or other gov-
ernment property, or detain a person to compel the government or
another person to act in a certain way.
Substantively, this deªnition bears some similarity to those in in-
ternational law. Its phrasing, however, offers no indication that inter-
national law’s various deªnitions have been inºuential. Parts of the
Indian deªnition are inconsistent with the core international law
deªnition, as discussed below.
4. New Zealand
New Zealand’s principal anti-terrorism statute is the Terrorism
Suppression Act 2002 (Terrorism Suppression Act), as supplemented
by the Counter-Terrorism Act 2003.343 Both evidence international
law’s role as the statutes’ guiding force. As a liberal Western democ-
racy, the threat highlighted by the September 11 attacks resonated
with New Zealand, despite its limited experiences with terrorism. 344
When considering the Terrorism Suppression Act in bill form,
which was amended following September 11 to comply with New Zea-
land’s international obligations, a Parliamentary review committee
speciªcally noted the obligations incumbent on New Zealand under
Resolution 1373 and their binding nature under Article 41 of the U.N.
Charter.345 New Zealand was anxious to be “seen to be playing its part”
                                                                                                                     
defense of India or in connection with any other purposes of the Government
of India, any State Government or any of their agencies, or detains any per-
son and threatens to kill or injure such person in order to compel the Gov-
ernment or any other person to do or abstain from doing any act[.]
Id.
343 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, §§ 3-4 (N.Z.), available at http://rangi.knowledge-
basket.co.nz/gpacts/public/text/2002/an/034.html.
344 In July 1985, agents of the Government of France detonated a bomb on board of a
Greenpeace ship docked in Auckland harbor, killing two people. As a state perpetrated
act, however, it does not constitute terrorism.
345 Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Comm., Interim Report on the Terror-
ism (Bombings and Financing) Bill 5 (2001) (N.Z.), http://www.clerk.parliament.govt.
nz//content/91/fd121int.pdf.
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in addressing international terrorism.346 The House of Representatives,
sitting under urgency, passed the bill. After the law received royal assent
but before the Terrorism Suppression Act came into force, the bomb-
ing in Bali, Indonesia occurred, killing three New Zealanders and thus
bringing the specter of international terrorism closer to home.
The Terrorism Suppression Act refers to New Zealand’s interna-
tional law obligations in framing its purpose as to “make provision to
implement New Zealand’s obligations under—(i) the Bombings Con-
vention; (ii) the Financing Convention and (iii) [Resolution 1373],”347
each of which are appended as schedules to the Terrorism Suppression
Act. Like other acts, it deªnes “terrorist act” and criminalizes causing a
terrorist bombing348 and ªnancing terrorism.349 It establishes a proce-
dure for the designation350 of “terrorists” and associated entities.351
The manifest intention to discharge the country’s international
obligations, combined with the lack of immediate terrorist threats
(which can distort a legislature’s vision), explains New Zealand’s close
attention to international law. Although Resolution 1373 did not pro-
vide a deªnition, the Parliamentary committee reviewing the draft
legislation speculated about the Security Council’s intentions when
recommending changes to the proposed deªnition.352 New Zealand’s
request of the C.T.C. underlines the shortcoming of the United Na-
tions in regards to the deªnition of terrorism: “Given the complexity
of some of the issues that arise in deªning terrorist acts, the New Zea-
land Government would welcome guidance from the Security Council
on what conduct it aims to cover by the term ‘terrorist acts’” in resolu-
tion 1373 . . . .”353
                                                                                                                     
346 Id.
347 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, §§ 3-4 (N.Z.). “Anti-Terrorism Resolution” is
deªned in § 4 to mean S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 42.
348 Id. § 7(1).
349 Id. § 8(1). Section 8(2) subjects § 8(1) to a speciªc exemption for collecting and
providing funds intended to be used for advocating democratic government or the protec-
tion of human rights. Id.
350 Id. §§ 20–21 (interim designation), 22–23 (ªnal designation).
351 Id. §§ 26–29. The act also states that decisions are reviewable (§ 33), revocable
(§ 34) and self terminating (§ 35). Id. §§ 36–41 (outlining procedure).
352 See Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Comm., Select Committee Report on
the Terrorism (Bombing and Financing (Suppression)) Bill 3 (Mar. 22, 2002) (N.Z.)
[hereinafter Select Committee Report], http://www.clerk.parliament.govt.nz//con-
tent/667/121bar2.pdf.
353 See Letter from Permanent Representative of N.Z. to the U.N. to the Chairman of
the C.T.C. (Dec. 24, 2001) annexed to Letter from the Chairman of the C.T.C. Concerning
Counter-Terrorism Addressed to the President of the Security Council (Dec. 27, 2001),
S/2001/1269, 6 [hereinafter Letter to the Counter-Terrorism Committee].
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New Zealand concluded that the Security Council’s conception
of terrorist offenses included acts beyond the terrorism conventions’
prohibitions. Changes were made to the legislation to reºect the
“wording used in similar European Union, Canadian and American
legislation” and to clarify the scope of the deªnition.354 For example,
the terms “intimidation,” “population,” and “lawful government” were
abandoned in favor of phrases such as “induce terror” and “civilian
population.”355 The term “serious bodily injury” was introduced to,
inter alia, “ensure consistency with the deªnition [from the Financing
Convention] of the term ‘terrorist act in armed conºict.’”356 Con-
cerns particularly important in New Zealand motivated other
changes, such as the prohibition on releasing disease-bearing organ-
isms, which was important given the state’s strong agricultural sector.
New Zealand reported to the C.T.C. that the deªnition was drafted “in
the same terms” as the Financing Convention.357
Under the Terrorism Suppression Act, there are three ways ac-
tions can constitute terrorism.358 First, “an act against” The Hague,
                                                                                                                     
354 Select Committee Report, supra note 352, at 3.
355 Id. at 4.
356 Id.
357 See Letter to the Counter-Terrorism Committee, supra note 353, at 6.
358 See Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, §§ 5(1)–(5) (N.Z.), available at http://rangi.
knowledge-basket.co.nz/gpacts/public/text/2002/an/034.html. This act deªned a “ter-
rorist act” in section 5 as:
(1)(a) the act falls within subsection (2); or
(b) the act is an act against a speciªed terrorism convention (as deªned in
section 4(1)); or
(c) the act is a terrorist act in armed conºict (as deªned in section 4(1)).
(2) An act falls within this subsection if it is intended to cause, in any 1 or
more countries, 1 or more of the outcomes speciªed in subsection (3), and is
carried out for the purpose of advancing an ideological, political, or religious
cause, and with the following intention:
(a) to induce terror in a civilian population; or
(b) to unduly compel or to force a government or an international or-
ganisation to do or abstain from doing any act.
(3) The outcomes referred to in subsection (2) are—
(a) the death of, or other serious bodily injury to, 1 or more persons
(other than a person carrying out the act):
(b) a serious risk to the health or safety of a population:
(c) destruction of, or serious damage to, property of great value or impor-
tance, or major economic loss, or major environmental damage, if likely to
result in 1 or more outcomes speciªed in paragraphs (a), (b), and (d):
(d) serious interference with, or serious disruption to, an infrastructure
facility, if likely to endanger human life:
(e) introduction or release of a disease-bearing organism, if likely to dev-
astate the national economy of a country.
86 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 29:23
Montreal, Internationally Protected Persons, Hostages, Maritime,
Bombings, and Nuclear Materials Conventions, or the Airports or
Fixed Platforms Protocols constitutes terrorism in New Zealand. Sec-
ond, acts done during an armed conºict against persons not actively
involved in the armed conºict and not wholly domestic in nature are
terrorism if done to compel a government or international organiza-
tion to act in a certain way. Third, acts done to advance an ideologi-
cal, political, or religious cause and to induce terror in any population
or to compel a government or international organization to act in a
certain way are terrorism if they cause one of the following outcomes:
death or serious injury; serious risk to public health or safety; destruc-
tion or serious damage to property of great value or importance; ma-
jor economic loss or major environmental damage if it threatens in-
jury, death, endangers life or the public health and safety; serious in-
terference with infrastructural facilities likely to endanger life; and
releasing disease-bearing organisms likely to devastate the national
economy. Acts done according to international law and during an
armed conºict situation are excluded from this deªnition.359
Although structurally similar to the U.K. deªnition, international
law was inºuential in determining the parameters of the deªnition,
although concerns speciªc to New Zealand also shaped it. The Austra-
lian counter-terrorism legislation360 also exhibits a structural similarity
                                                                                                                     
(4) However, an act does not fall within subsection (2) if it occurs in a situa-
tion of armed conºict and is, at the time and in the place that it occurs, in ac-
cordance with rules of international law applicable to the conºict.
(5) To avoid doubt, the fact that a person engages in any protest, advocacy, or
dissent, or engages in any strike, lockout, or other industrial action, is not, by
itself, a sufªcient basis for inferring that the person—
(a) is carrying out an act for a purpose, or with an intention, speciªed in
subsection (2); or
(b) intends to cause an outcome speciªed in subsection (3).
Id.
359 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, (N.Z.).
360 The Australian Government rejected long-standing advice against enacting speciªc
anti-terrorism legislation. Michael Head, ‘Counter-Terrorism’ Laws: A Threat to Political Free-
dom, Civil Liberties and Constitutional Rights, 26 Melb. U. L. Rev. 666, 670–71 (2002). See
generally Nathan Hancock, Dep’t of the Parliamentary Library Info. & Research
Servs., Research Paper No. 12 2001-02, Terrorism and the Law in Australia: Legis-
lation, Commentary and Constraints (2002). Since September 2001, Australia has en-
acted six statutes designed to protect against terrorism such as: the Security Legislation
Amendment (Terrorism) Act, 2002; Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Act, 2002;
Criminal Code Amendment (Espionage & Related Matter Act) Act, 2002; Telecommunica-
tions Interception Legislation Amendment Act, 2002; Border Security Legislation
Amendment Act, 2002; and Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation
Amendment (Terrorism) Act, 2003. The Criminal Code Amendment (Terrorism) Act,
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2003, was also passed to provide for federal terrorism offenses. The Security Legislation
Act, 2002, amends the Criminal Code Act, 1995. Speciªcally it deªnes and criminalizes
engaging in “terrorist acts” and preparing for or planning terrorist acts. Criminal Code Act
1995 §§ 100.1, 101.1, 101.6 (Austl.).
As amended, the Australian Criminal Code deªnes terrorism as a threat or action that
causes a prohibited terrorist outcome and is done with the intention of advancing a politi-
cal, religious, or ideological cause and with the intention of coercing or inºuencing by
intimidation an Australian or foreign government or intimidating the public in Australia
or elsewhere. Prohibited terrorist outcomes are enumerated: causing serious physical
harm or death to a person; endangering another person’s life or creating a serious risk to
the health and safety of a section of the public; causing serious property damage; and de-
stroying or seriously interfering or disrupting an electronic system (such as telecommuni-
cations, ªnancial or public utility system). Industrial, advocacy or protest action not in-
tended to harm, kill, or endanger others or create a risk to the public’s health and safety
are expressly excluded from the list of proscribed outcomes Criminal Code Act 1995,
§ 100.1 (Austl.). Speciªcally, it states:
(1) Terrorist act means an action or threat of action where:
(a) the action falls within subsection (2) and does not fall within subsection
(3); and
(b) the action is done or the threat is made with the intention of advancing
a political, religious or ideological cause; and
(c) the action is done or the threat is made with the intention of:
(i) coercing, or inºuencing by intimidation, the government of
the Commonwealth or a State, Territory or foreign country, or of part of a
State, Territory or foreign country; or
(ii) intimidating the public or a section of the public.
(2) Action falls within this subsection if it:
(a) causes serious harm that is physical harm to a person; or
(b) causes serious damage to property; or
(c) causes a person’s death; or
(d) endangers a person’s life, other than the life of the person taking the
action; or
(e) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of
the public; or
(f) seriously interferes with, seriously disrupts, or destroys, an electronic
system including, but not limited to:
(i) an information system; or
(ii) a telecommunications system; or
(iii) a ªnancial system; or
(iv) a system used for the delivery of essential government serv-
ices; or
(v) a system used for, or by, an essential public utility; or
(vi) a system used for, or by, a transport system.
(3) Action falls within this subsection if it:
(a) is advocacy, protest, dissent or industrial action; and
(b) is not intended:
(i) to cause serious harm that is physical harm to a per-son; or
(ii) to cause a person’s death; or
(iii) to endanger the life of a person, other than the per-son tak-
ing the action; or
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to the U.K. deªnition. Yet, whereas international law was a motivation
and guide to New Zealand’s legislation, it played an advocacy role in
the debate on the deªnition of terrorism in the Australian legislation
when it was open to public comment. The Australian Senate Legal and
Constitutional Committee (Committee), expressing concern at the
bill’s principal deªnition, speciªcally noted the difªculties with
deªning terrorism at international law361 but cited with approval a
submission that listed various deªnitions at international law (including
the Elimination Declaration) and in U.S. legislation.362 The Committee
later concluded:
The Committee considers that there is no compelling reason
why Australian legislation should reach further than legisla-
tion enacted in the United Kingdom, the USA or Canada, or
as proposed in New Zealand . . . . While the Committee ac-
knowledges the difªculties that have been experienced in-
ternationally in deªning terrorism, all the deªnitions that
have been drawn to the Committee’s attention during this
inquiry contain some element of intent to cause extreme
fear to the public and/or coerce the government. The
Committee considers that this element is at the very heart of
the nature of terrorism. 363
The reference to “internationally,” in this context, appears to refer
both to international law and comparative law. Through comparisons
with international law and like jurisdictions, the Committee recom-
mended that the concept of terrorism be given a meaning consistent
with other deªnitions. On this basis, for example, the Committee rec-
                                                                                                                     
(iv) to create a serious risk to the health or safety of the public
or a section of the public.
(4) In this Division:
(a) a reference to any person or property is a reference to any person or
property wherever situated, within or outside Australia; and
(b) a reference to the public includes a reference to the public of a coun-
try other than Australia.
Id.
361 S. Legal and Constitutional Comm., Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill
2002 [No.2] [and related legislation], ¶ 3.53 (2002) (Austl.), available at http://www.aph.gov.
au/senate/committee/legcon_ctte/completed_inquiries/2002-
04/terrorism/report/report.pdf.
362 Id. ¶¶ 3.56–.59 (citing Submission 136).
363 Id. ¶ 3.76.
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ommended the inclusion of an element of intent, which was previously
absent from the legislation.
D. Comparison with the Core International Law Deªnition
Having brieºy examined the domestic deªnitions of four states, this
section compares these domestic deªnitions with the core deªnition of
terrorism identiªed in Part Two. Although signiªcant and important
differences are discernable, the domestic deªnitions are broadly similar
to the international law deªnition.
The following nine topics correspond to the nine themes present
in the international law deªnition of terrorism and examined in Part
2, Section F. As discussed, the international deªnition can be seen as a
minimum deªnition; its subject matter is less controversial than some
other aspects of deªning terrorism, as illustrated by the high rate of
ratiªcation of the conventions from which the minimum deªnition
arises. The following discussion examines whether the United King-
dom, United States, India, and New Zealand—all of which are com-
mitted to the rule of law and well-resourced—meet these minimum
conditions. Appendix 2 compares, in summary form, the elements of
the international law deªnition with the equivalent parts of the do-
mestic deªnitions and may provide the reader with a useful guide to
this section of the Article.364
1. International Law Contemplates Serious Injury, Death, and Serious
Property Damage Causing Economic Harm as Proscribed Terrorist
Outcomes
Causing death or serious harm to persons is a sufªcient harm
under each statutory deªnition. Only in New Zealand and the United
Kingdom, however, must the injury be serious. In India and under
section 2331(1) in the United States, lesser harms sufªce. Endanger-
ing life, acts dangerous to human life, and activities creating a serious
risk to public safety or health are also prohibited in the United King-
dom and New Zealand. While seemingly consistent with the interna-
tional prohibition’s thrust, the conventions are directed at actual, not
potential, harm, and thus these potential harms go beyond the inter-
national law deªnition.
Property damage sufªces under each domestic deªnition (al-
though section 2332b (U.S.) refers to particular kinds of property dam-
                                                                                                                     
364 See Appendix 2.
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age). At international law, only signiªcant (“extensive” in the Bombings
Convention) property damage is a prohibited outcome and such prop-
erty damage must result in economic harm. Furthermore, the property
must have some public function (for example, transportation systems or
markets), although this is not a settled distinction at international law.
The domestic deªnitions do not require wider economic conse-
quences. For example, the United Kingdom and Australia simply re-
quire “serious damage to property” and, under the Indian Act, any loss,
destruction, or damage to property is sufªcient. In contrast, New Zea-
land’s provision for bio-terrorism (that it must devastate a country’s
economy), and serious damage to property, major environmental dam-
age, and causing major economic loss (each of which must harm or
endanger persons) shows a standard broadly consistent with interna-
tional law if the contingent consequences at international law include
not only economic harm but also harm to people. Such a conclusion is
supported by one reading of the aviation and Maritime conventions.
New Zealand is, however, the only jurisdiction providing for pure eco-
nomic harm, which is clearly beyond international law’s deªnition.
Section 2332b’s listed offenses encompass property damage and to
a certain extent resemble the international conventions’ subject matter,
although the offenses are not generally limited to serious damage. This
provision, like the United Kingdom deªnition, provides that harm to
electronic systems or services also constitutes terrorism. If restricted to
serious harm or disruption (as in the United Kingdom), this seems con-
sistent with the international concept of serious property damage. Such
damage can cause signiªcant economic and physical harm. But
speciªcally proscribing harm to property and electronic systems, which
would otherwise be included under the general property damage head-
ing, indicates that the deªnitions might contemplate cyber-terrorism
(including, for example, attacks on banking services through the inter-
net).365 Destruction of computer-stored data might arguably be cov-
ered. Cyber-terrorism is not speciªcally provided for at international
law and whether international law and/or the domestic deªnitions pro-
tect pure information is open to conjecture. India’s prohibition on
“disruption of essential supplies and services essential to the life of the
community” appears to contemplate any damage to essential services or
supplies. Simply cutting a telephone line and thereby disrupting tele-
                                                                                                                     
365 See Peter Lichtenbaum & Melanie Schneck, The Response to Cyberattacks: Balancing Se-
curity and Cost, 36 Int’l Law. 39, 40-43 (2002) (discussing the U.S. response to cybersecu-
rity threat); Brenner & Goodman, supra note 31, at 27-44 (discussing cyberterrorism sce-
narios).
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communications would probably not constitute terrorism at interna-
tional law, but it would in India.
Although the domestic deªnitions appear generally consistent
with the international law concept, their prohibitions are wider, en-
compass less serious harm and potential harm, and do not condition
property damage on detrimental economic consequences.
2. At International Law the Terrorist Act Must Be Independently
Criminal
This feature is present in both U.S. deªnitions. Although not pres-
ent in the other states’ deªnitions, the general approach is still
inºuential. To commit the offense of terrorist bombing contrary to sec-
tion 62 of the U.K. Act, the conduct must fall within the deªnition of
terrorism and violate a listed offense. The U.K. drafters consciously ex-
cluded criminality from the deªnition because they thought it would
unduly narrow the deªnition.366 By requiring underlying criminality as
an element of the terrorist offences, however, an act of terrorism must
still be independently criminal despite the deªnition of terrorism,
thereby providing a similar type of protection to the accused. Inde-
pendent criminality is not a feature of the Indian deªnition, however,
and simply committing a “terrorist act” in India is an offense (the same
is true in Australia).367
Although underlying criminality is unnecessary in India, whether
as part of the deªnition or the offense provisions, it is required in the
United States, United Kingdom, and New Zealand. Given that many
police powers are triggered by a determination of terrorism or the des-
ignation of an entity as such, the deªnition-offense distinction is
signiªcant. The latter allows police powers to be exercised in more cir-
cumstances than the former would.
3. International Law Requires Intimidation of a Population or
Coercion of a Government or an International Organization
Each domestic jurisdiction reºects this foundational requirement.
The deªnitions typically speak of coercing, inºuencing, and compel-
ling governments, and intimidating the population or part thereof, or
                                                                                                                     
366 H.L. Deb. vol. 611, col. 1484-85, Apr. 6, 2000, available at http://www.parliament.
the-stationery-ofªce.co.uk/pa/ld199900/ldhansrd/vo000406/text/00406-08.htm.
367 Prevention of Terrorism Act 2002, § 3(1) (India); Criminal Code Act 1995, § 100.1.
(Austl.).
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of striking terror.368 Notably, New Zealand uses a higher standard by
requiring the undue compulsion or forcing of government policy369
(which oddly implies that some compulsion, as opposed to mere politi-
cal pressure, is acceptable) while section 2331(1) requires a lower in-
timidation standard when the harm is mass destruction, assassination,
or kidnapping (compare “affect the conduct of a government” in the
case of mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping with “inºuence
the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion” for other
harms). India’s deªnition requires more than intimidation. It states
that acts must “threaten the unity, integrity, security or sovereignty of
India,”370 which is a wholly indigenous formulation and facially sets a
high bar, although its ambiguity may permit a less restrictive reading.
Section 2332b, which is restricted to effects on government, does
not require intimidation or coercion if the act is calculated to “retaliate
against government policy.” Potentially, this is a very wide exception to
the usual requirement of intimidation or coercion. The U.K. deªnition
also waives the intimidation or coercion requirement when ªrearms or
explosives are employed to achieve the proscribed harms.371 This ex-
ception may also swallow the rule, and it undermines a fundamental
element of what constitutes terrorism. It has some support at interna-
tional law, however, to the extent that the Bombings Convention’s prin-
cipal prohibition does not require intimidation or coercion.372
Under the deªnitions, with the exception of India, the target of
the intimidation or coercion is not restricted by geography. All
deªnitions contemplate coercion of either the state’s government(s) or
a foreign government (with the exception of India, which is restricted
to Indian governments).373 This is consistent with developments at in-
ternational law. Section 2331(1) and the New Zealand deªnition im-
plicitly contemplate the intimidating of a (meaning any) civilian popu-
lation, whereas the U.K. deªnition expressly applies to civilian popula-
                                                                                                                     
368 18 U.S.C. §2331(1)(B); Prevention of Terrorism Act 2002, § 3(1) (India); Terror-
ism Suppression Act 2002, § 5(2) (N.Z.)Terrorism Act 2000 §1(1)(b) (U.K.).
369 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 § 5(2)(b) (N.Z.).
370 Prevention of Terrorism Act 2002 § 3(1) (India).
371 Terrorism Act 2000 § 1(3) (U.K.).
372 Bombings Convention art. 2(1); see also Nuclear Terrorism Convention, supra note
51, art. 2 (which, although open for signature after the legislation was passed, offers sup-
port for this approach.).
373 See 18 U.S.C. §2331(1)(B); Prevention of Terrorism Act 2002, § 3(1) (India); Ter-
rorism Suppression Act 2002, § 5(2) (N.Z.)Terrorism Act 2000 §1(1)(b) (U.K.).
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tions inside and outside the state’s territorial jurisdiction.374 India ap-
pears to require terror in an Indian population.
A further target at international law is international organiza-
tions. Compelling such entities constitutes terrorism only under the
New Zealand deªnition.375
All the deªnitions require that the intimidation or coercion (or
equivalent) be “intended” (India, New Zealand, and section 2331(1));
“designed” (U.K.); or “calculated” (section 2332b). Given that the act
causing the intimidation or coercion must be intended, employing a
mens rea standard other than intent for these consequences is not of
heightened concern, and international law does not appear to direct
that the intimidation or coercion be intended. Section 2331 employs an
objective determination by stating “appears to be intended,” unlike the
subjective approach of the other jurisdictions and the prevailing ap-
proach at international law. This is consistent, however, with interna-
tional law that uses the standard “calculated” (also used in section
2332b). “Calculated” was ªrst used in the 1937 Terrorism Convention
and repeated in the 1994 General Assembly Elimination Declaration in
the context of “intended or calculated” (although it is used elsewhere
in Title 18, so it does not necessarily reºect international law’s direct
inºuence).
4. The Range of Victims at International Law Excludes Military
Targets but Expressly Includes Internationally Protected Persons
and Civilians
Most domestic deªnitions do not expressly deªne a class of victims;
rather, they refer just to persons and property. Because the deªnitions
do not limit property damage to government-owned property, the de-
struction of private property is sufªcient to constitute a terrorist attack.
Unlike at international law, there is no suggestion that such property
must have a public function.
Section 2332b’s listed offenses include the destruction of national
defense installations. The case for the international law deªnition ex-
cluding violent acts against military targets is strong, thus indicating
section 2332b is inconsistent with international law in this regard. The
                                                                                                                     
374 Id. c. 11, § 1(4)(c) (U.K.); Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, § 5(2)(a)(a) (N.Z.).
375 India’s deªnition may also be taken to extend to international organizations if
“persons” includes legal persons (and the provision is given extraterritorial applicability).
This runs contrary to the context and the other uses of the term in the provision. See Pre-
vention of Terrorism Act 2002, § 1(3) (India).
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U.S. Department of State considers unarmed and off-duty military per-
sonnel to be noncombatants.376 This approach classiªes the October
23, 1983 attack on a Beirut Marines barracks that killed 242 servicemen
as terrorism.377 Similarly, the State Department considers attacks on
military installations during a period without hostilities to be terrorism.
The domestic deªnitions’ references to “persons,” “public,” and “popu-
lation” arguably include military personnel. The use of “citizenry,” and
perhaps “public,” might exclude military personnel although perhaps
also government ofªcials that must be protected under the interna-
tional conception of the range of victims. The line between when mili-
tary personnel are “civilians” (for example, reservists living at home
during time of non-hostilities) and when engaged in military service
(for example, on active patrol) is hard to draw. For the clariªcation of
doubt, if states wish to deviate from international law’s exclusion of
military targets, express reference should be made (as in section 2332b
and the Indian deªnition).378 It is certainly within a state’s interest to
deªne the range of victims widely, as this increases the number of at-
tacks the state can classify as terrorist (thereby triggering, inter alia, in-
creased investigative powers). It also gives greater protection to the
military. Similarly hard cases are presented by non-military enterprises
involved in war efforts (for example, factories producing weapons) and
civilians employed in military operations. Notably the offense of terror-
ism drafted for the U.S. Military Commission simply refers to “persons,”
without further elaboration.379
India’s deªnition also expressly protects “property [and] equip-
ment used or intended to be used for the defence of India.” Given the
anomaly that protecting military property but not servicepersons would
present, one might infer that India considers the reference to “persons”
to include military personnel. The same may be said of the United
States. In light of the state’s signature and intention to implement the
conventions, a domestic court might interpret “person” in light of the
state’s international obligations. When two interpretations are possible,
                                                                                                                     
376 Brian Whitaker, The Deªnition of Terrorism, The Guardian Unlimited, May 7, 2001,
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/elsewhere/journalist/story/0,7792,487098,00.html.
377 U.S. Dep’t of State, Signiªcant Terrorist Incidents, 1961–2003: A Brief Chronology (2004),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/5902.htm.
378 Cf. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)
(clarifying that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of na-
tions if any other possible construction remains, and consequently can never be construed
to violate neutral rights, or to affect neutral commerce, further than is warranted by the
law of nations as understood in this country”).
379 U.S. Military Commission Instructions Sourcebook, supra note 195, at 13, § 2.
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the one consistent with international law should be preferred. Textual
ambiguity should be construed in favor of harmony with international
law.380 Furthermore, while attacks on civilians are likely to intimidate
the public, small-scale attacks on military personnel are unlikely to have
this effect. It is also not clear such attacks “coerce the government” ei-
ther.
By implication, the New Zealand deªnition of terrorism excludes
attacks on military personnel “taking an active part in the hostilities,”
although it is unclear whether this is broader or narrower than the
U.S. Department of State approach.381
The vexing issue of the legitimacy of military targets is very much
a live issue. The international law position is clear, as is that in New
Zealand, India, and the United States. Ambiguity in the United King-
dom’s deªnition may be interpreted to avoid a conºict with interna-
tional law, although the laws of armed conºict may interpose a con-
trary interpretative guide.
5. International Law’s Approach to Terrorism Does Not Require That
“Terrorist” Acts Are Carried Out for the Purpose of Advancing a
Political, Religious, or Ideological Cause
The U.S. and Indian deªnitions are similar in not requiring a
speciªc motivation. The United Kingdom and New Zealand, however,
require that the act is done with the “purpose” of advancing a political,
religious, or ideological cause. The 1994 General Assembly Elimination
Declaration refers to these three causes as well as philosophical, racial,
and ethnic causes in declaring terrorist acts unjustiªable. The U.K. leg-
islation inºuenced the New Zealand draftsmen, so the similarity of the
clauses is not coincidental. The three motivations selected and the oth-
ers in the General Assembly Elimination Declaration certainly overlap
                                                                                                                     
380 See, e.g., Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. at 118; New Zealand Pilots’ Ass’n Inc. v. A-G, [1997] 3
N.Z. L.R. 269, 289 (C.A.); J.H. Rayner Ltd. v. Dep’t of Trade and Indus., [1990] 2 A.C. 418
(H.L.); see also Ahmad v. Inner London Educ. Auth., [1978] 1 Q.B. 36, 48 (C.A.). Note,
however, the question of whether international law is sufªciently precise to be of interpre-
tative assistance would have to be addressed by the court.
381 The New Zealand deªnition states that a terrorist act occurring in an armed
conºict is an act “(a) that occurs in a situation of armed conºict; and (b) the purpose of
which, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government
or an international organisation to do or abstain from doing any act; and (c) that is in-
tended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian or other person not taking an
active part in the hostilities in that situation; and (d) that is not excluded from the applica-
tion of the Financing Convention by art. 3 of that Convention.” Terrorism Suppression Act
2002, § 4(1) (N.Z.).
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to a signiªcant extent. But given that the requirement of a particular
motivation restricts the scope of terrorism and the state’s interest in
deªning terrorism widely, it is unclear why these three were chosen.
Their absence from the deªnition arising from the conventions indi-
cates that this qualiªcation of the deªnition is not a part of the interna-
tional deªnition of terrorism.
6. At International Law, Causing a Prohibited Terrorist Outcome
Must Be Intended
Aside from the New Zealand deªnition, none of the deªnitions
surveyed in this study attach a mens rea requirement to the proscribed
outcomes. In New Zealand the act must be intended to cause one of
the prohibited terrorist outcomes, whereas under section 2331(1) an
act only need be, for example, dangerous to human life to constitute a
proscribed terrorist outcome. Although all states require that the in-
timidation or coercion be intended, the action producing this conse-
quence need not be intended. Some states utilize the independent
criminality approach (noted above) so that to constitute terrorism, an
act must meet the deªnition of terrorism and be independently crimi-
nal. Some states include independent criminality in their deªnition,
while others include it in offense provisions. Thus, terrorist crimes
generally incorporate the deªnition and either a mens rea standard
relating to performing the act or another crime. In India, however,
where the deªnition does not include independent criminality or an
intention to do the act causing the harm, simply engaging in an act of
terrorism is illegal. The intent requirement in the Indian deªnition
relates only to threatening the state rather than, for example, detonat-
ing a bomb. Not requiring independent criminality and not attaching a
mens rea standard to performing the act is inconsistent with interna-
tional law. In contrast, sections 2331(1) and 2332b in the United States
require the violation of a criminal law as an element of international
terrorism thereby incorporating a mens rea standard.
Unlike the other jurisdictions, the New Zealand legislation re-
quires that the act’s outcome be intended. Some crimes in the Terror-
ism Suppression Act—such as ªnancing terrorism—incorporate the
deªnition and also require, for example, funding to be “wilful and
without lawful excuse.” Although this duplicates the mens rea require-
ment, the same evidence might satisfy both requirements. Further-
more, in New Zealand an offense against a terrorism convention is also
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terrorism under New Zealand domestic criminal law382 and each con-
vention offense speciªes a mens rea standard.
7. The International Deªnition Focuses on Terrorism of an
International Character
The Indian deªnition does not expressly address whether ele-
ments of the act of terrorism can be extra-territorial, whereas the U.K.
and New Zealand deªnitions expressly contemplate acts and harms ir-
respective of location. Both the U.S. deªnitions indicate an interna-
tional focus.383 Section 2331(1) is limited to acts that transcend national
boundaries. Some of section 2332b’s listed crimes are international in
orientation (for example, murdering, kidnapping, and maiming per-
sons abroad or even committing violence at international airports), but
others appear to be largely domestic in character (for example, the kill-
ing of Supreme Court Justices).384
Despite their extraterritorial jurisdiction, with the exception of
section 2331(1), the deªnitions also cover purely domestic acts. Al-
though not the focus of the international conception of terrorism,
prohibiting purely intra-state terrorism is a strong state interest and a
necessary implication of international law’s approach to counter-terror-
ism. International law certainly does not preclude the criminalization
of purely domestic terrorism and, to a large extent, state internal stabil-
ity is to the advantage of the international system.
8. The International Deªnition and the Domestic Deªnitions Speak
to Acts of Terrorism by a Single Person as Terrorism; Group
Conduct or Participation Is Not a Requirement
Each of the deªnitions is the same as international law in this re-
gard. Furthermore, none of the deªnitions expressly exclude govern-
ment or ofªcial conduct (even if acting through individual actors) from
the deªnition. Although one commentator has identiªed that national
deªnitions are split on whether terrorist acts must be perpetrated by
groups or if individuals can commit terrorist crimes,385 the jurisdictions
examined here are unambiguous in not requiring group conduct.
                                                                                                                     
382 See id. § 5(1)(b) (N.Z.).
383 There is a domestic analogue to § 2331(1) in 18 U.S.C.A. § 2331(5).
384 18 U.S.C.A. § 351(a) (2004).
385 Walter, supra note 33, at 30-31.
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9. Justiªcations and Defenses
Like international law, none of the domestic deªnitions, nor the
statutes they sit within, provide for a political exception whereby ter-
rorism committed for a particular purpose is excused or justiªed.
E. The Domestic Implementation of the Minimum Deªnition of Terrorism
Terrorists frequently operate transnationally and terrorism’s
cross-border effects motivated the international community to create
treaties obligating states to criminalize certain acts of terrorism in
their domestic criminal law. Resolution 1373 buttresses these obliga-
tions. The conventions and resolutions evidence the international
community’s desire to facilitate a common approach. States do not
legislate to prohibit terrorism in a vacuum and must be cognizant of
their international obligations. Given the transnational nature of ter-
rorism, anti-terrorism measures, initiatives, and legal instruments will
operate more efªciently if states deªne terrorism consistently. Given
the pursuit of common and equivalent jurisdiction, legislating in har-
mony with international law is crucial and drawing on international
law’s jurisprudence concerning the deªnition of terrorism is logical.
Speaking descriptively, have states done this?
The content of the concept of terrorism at international law and
the deªnitions enacted by the four states is broadly similar. The inter-
national deªnition’s major elements are common to the domestic
deªnitions. There are differences, however, some of which reºect ar-
eas of relative uncertainty at international law. For example, the states
proscribe a wider range of harms than international law does. Other
differences are a result of drafting technique. As discussed, on their
face, some jurisdictions do not use the underlying criminality concept
in their deªnition of terrorism in contrast to international law. But
others effectively make this a requirement by requiring that the acts
that constitute a terrorist offense are independently unlawful.
The two issues on which there is substantive divergence are the
legitimacy of military targets and the need for a particular motivation.
Consistent with international law, New Zealand regards persons in-
volved in active hostilities as outside the range of victims. The other
states’ laws are less clear and arguably protect military personnel and
property under their general prohibition against harm. States are the
primary actors in the international system and a powerful force in de-
termining the conventions’ content, the focus of which is usually on
the position that best protects that state’s interests. Reference has
been made to one example: the United States is pushing for the in-
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clusion of some military targets in the deªnition in the Draft Com-
prehensive Terrorism Convention. National agendas, usually reºected
in domestic law, inºuence the formation of international law, as in-
ternational law inºuences the formation of domestic deªnitions. The
relationship is one of cross-fertilization.
The United States, United Kingdom, and New Zealand imple-
mented the prohibitions in the Bombings and Financing Conventions
faithfully and closely followed the conventions’ phrasing.386 Despite
differences, India’s deªnition is also broadly consistent with interna-
tional law. Given this apparent willingness to follow international law,
why are there distinctions between the international law concept of
terrorism and the domestic deªnitions?
First, as illustrated above, extracting the deªnition of terrorism
from the relevant international sources requires one to abstract from
the speciªc prohibitions and resolutions. This process generates a con-
cept of terrorism that sits above the particular sources. States must
actively search for and distill the deªnition. It is not found in a single
instrument that states are required to implement, although the inter-
national organizations’ model deªnitions—such as that of the Com-
monwealth Secretariat—draw on international conventional law. In
other words, states must actively seek deªnitional guidance from in-
ternational law because it is not readily apparent. Second, because the
deªnition is arrived at by abstraction, within bounds, there can be le-
gitimate disagreement over the parameters of the deªnition. Third,
states view international law differently. New Zealand was very eager
for international guidance and actively sought to follow international
law. Other states more jealously guard their sovereign right to deter-
mine their own laws, either based on a normative commitment to in-
dependence or simply because doing so is conducive to national in-
terest. Fourth, international law is only one of the relevant considera-
tions taken into account in the anti-terrorism law-making process and
may be “outweighed” by other considerations, which are likely to be
weighty when national security issues are implicated.
Strong policy reasons exist to induce states to deviate from the
core deªnition identiªed in Part Two. If some states simply discharge
their international treaty obligations while others go further, however,
we are denied some of the beneªts of a consistent deªnition and anti-
                                                                                                                     
386 Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, §§63, 64 (U.K.); Terrorist Bombings Convention Im-
plementation Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–197, §§ 201–203, 116 Stat. 721 (2002); Terror-
ism Suppression Act, 2002, §§ 7, 8 (N.Z.).
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terrorism regime. To take a simple example, if bio-terrorism is a crime
only in New Zealand, India may be reluctant (or even unable) to assist
with the investigation and extradition of the alleged terrorist. States
may, however, legitimately conclude that the cost of deªning terror-
ism differently than other states is outweighed by the beneªt of the
heightened protection. Notwithstanding this, the international deªni-
tion should set a ºoor, or the minimum conditions, of the deªnition,
not a ceiling.
States are, and must be, entitled to proscribe conduct beyond
that which they are required to proscribe pursuant to international
obligations. As stressed throughout the Article, the core international
deªnition that arises is derived from the existing conventions. To ªnd
expression in a convention, a signiªcant number of states must con-
sent to the prohibition. This causes the formation of international
terrorism treaties to be a slow process. The lack of a provision in in-
ternational law for prohibiting cyber-terrorism, in contrast to some
states’ laws, shows that often international law lags behind domestic
law. The international deªnition should be regarded as a minimum;
states’ deªnitions should be assessed against this standard. States are
entitled to proscribe further conduct, as states in this study have done
(for example, India’s protection of military equipment). To think oth-
erwise would wrongly construe international law, rather than the
state, as the source of sovereignty.387 The acute need to address threats
such as cyber-terrorism underline why states cannot be bound by in-
ternational law’s slow-developing deªnition. Particular state interests
(for example, the protection of New Zealand’s large agricultural sec-
tor) necessitate national tailoring of terrorism legislation.
The above analysis shows that, in most instances, the four states
have met the minimum conditions provided by the core deªnition at
international law, although there are some exceptions (for example,
the requirement that the commission of the act itself be intended,
which is not met in India). Is the similarity coincidental or the prod-
uct of international law’s inºuence? The New Zealand Parliamentary
review committee strove to harmonize New Zealand’s then-draft legis-
lation with international law obligations. Speciªc changes were made
to adopt the wording of the Financing Convention, and the C.T.C. was
consulted regarding the Security Council’s intended deªnition. Sub-
stantive guidance was, although not forthcoming from the C.T.C.,
                                                                                                                     
387 See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 39, 43 (Apr. 9) (separate opinion of
Judge Alvarez).
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found in the terms of the conventions and might now be found, to an
extent, in Resolution 1566. International law was also inºuential in
Australia where it (and other domestic jurisdictions) served as a yard-
stick by which to assess Australia’s draft legislation. Providing a point
of comparison is an important function, as non-governmental entities
can build law reform arguments on this basis. International law does
not appear to have been particularly persuasive in either the United
States or India, although their deªnitions are substantively similar to
the international deªnition.
New Zealand’s experience indicates that some states will seek to
follow international law. Furthermore, states without signiªcant draft-
ing resources might willingly adopt “pre-made” deªnitions. To this
end, the model deªnitions based on the existing conventional law be-
ing developed and recommended by international agencies such as
the Commonwealth Secretariat and U.N. Ofªce for Drugs and Crime
might become popular. Together these two effects will produce, in
time, a large number of states with deªnitions of terrorism satisfying
this minimum condition supplied by international law.
It is unclear when, if ever, agreement will allow the Comprehen-
sive Terrorism Convention to be opened for signature. Even if this
does not receive sufªcient support, a customary rule might arise in
time, based on the evidence of consistent domestic deªnitions moti-
vated by a sense of obligation to harmonize their deªnitions of terror-
ism with the international deªnition for legal and practical reasons,
notwithstanding that some states continue to support terrorism and
inhibit the development of a comprehensive treaty.
Conclusion
“Terrorism” no longer describes state conduct. It now refers to
the acts of sub-state actors. Similarly, its function is no longer just a
term expressing moral condemnation. It is now used as a legal term,
and thus should be accompanied by a legal deªnition. There are dan-
gers in using terrorism as a legal term without deªning it, as the wide-
spread potential for (and some actual) avoidance and abuse of Secu-
rity Council 1373’s obligations illustrates.
The ªrst attempt to deªne terrorism in the 1937 Terrorism Con-
vention failed. Its abstract deªnition was not acceptable to states, at
least partially due to the difªculty of implementing the deªnition in
domestic legislation. Similarly, the U.S. draft in 1972, which deªned
terrorism in the abstract, did not attract sufªcient support to be
opened for signature. Rather than continue to attempt to establish a
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universal jurisdiction with respect to terrorism,388 the international
community, through conventions and Security Council and General
Assembly resolutions, opted for a system whereby states exercise do-
mestic criminal jurisdiction over acts of terrorism. This incremental
criminalization has produced a list of disparate proscribed acts
reºecting those acts that most harm states’ interests but upon which
agreement can be reached.
On its face, this approach does not provide a deªnition of terror-
ism. As shown, when the overlap of the individual prohibitions is
viewed alongside the consistent themes that run through the conven-
tions, however, a core deªnition of terrorism is discernable. It repre-
sents a minimum condition that states’ deªnitions ought to satisfy.
States may adopt a deªnition consistent with the minimum interna-
tional law deªnition through three mechanisms (aside from the possi-
bility of a comprehensive treaty): ªrst, states voluntarily enacting
deªnitions of terrorism that are consistent with international law and
its obligations; second, states adopting draft model legislation provided
by international organizations and potentially the C.T.C.; and third, the
development of a customary rule demanding that states criminalizing
terrorism. The ªrst and second factors may establish sufªcient state
practice to allow a plausible case for the existence of a customary rule
requiring states to prevent and punish terrorism to be put forward.
Whether this rule will crystallize before the conclusion of a compre-
hensive anti-terrorism multilateral treaty solution is unlikely yet possi-
ble. In the interim—which could be lengthy—international law is ca-
pable of providing leadership on the deªnition of terrorism but, as is
the case so often with international law, states must be willing to be
lead. The extent to which there is bilateral and/or multilateral pressure
on states to implement international treaty obligations is most likely to
be directly related to whether terrorist entities continue to strike (or
perhaps simply threaten) the interests of powerful states.
                                                                                                                     
388 See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.) 2002 I.C.J. 121(Feb.
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Appendix 1: International Anti-Terrorism Instruments and Their Signature and
Ratiªcation Statuses1
Instrument (with adopted or










Convention (1973) 25 153













(0 since September 11,
2001)
132
(108 since September 11,
2001)
Financing Convention (1999) 132
(88 since September 11,
2001)
132




1 As of December 31. 2004. (Report of the Secretary-General on Measures to Eliminate
International Terrorism, Doc. A/59/210, Dec. 31, 2004).
2 As of September 16, 2005.
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